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Beyond Nudging: Debiasing Consumers Through 
Mixed Framing 
abstract.  The consumer-protection literature can be divided into two camps: laissez-faire 
libertarianism and paternalism. Paternalism, as advanced by behavioral law and economics, calls 
for nudging consumers toward their utility-maximizing preference. Laissez-faire libertarianism, 
instead, calls for relying on rational-choice theory and the free market to allocate consumer goods. 
Although each camp presents the other as its diametric opponent, this Note shows that this di-
chotomy is overstated. Neither camp is incompatible with the other, nor infallible on its own. 
Through an original behavioral study, this Note reveals flaws in the fundamental assumptions of 
both camps: that no information can be conveyed neutrally (behavioral law and economics) and 
that consumer-oriented regulation diminishes autonomy (rational-choice theory). It does so by 
focusing on an understudied form of consumer-protection regulation: mixed framing. Legal schol-
ars and regulators have largely ignored this phenomenon, yet it offers a more robust and actionable 
regulatory approach than the existing literature and one that is distinct from both paternalism and 
libertarianism. By examining the case study of food-safety regulations, this Note sketches the an-
alytic and normative case for why regulators should embrace mixed framing. Using a process of 
debiasing through mixed framing, agencies can promulgate rules that minimize the risk of decep-
tive advertising tactics and maximize the provision of neutral and complete information—without 
running afoul of the First Amendment or falling into paternalistic restrictions on autonomy. 
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I know . . . an economist . . . [who] would have said . . . that . . . a dis-
count and a surcharge are the same thing economically. . . . But we live 
in a world that not everybody is an economist, and many people think 
it’s quite a different thing. 




Behavioral law and economics recently went to court. In Expressions Hair De-
sign v. Schneiderman, New York merchants challenged a state law permitting dis-
counts for cash purchases but banning equivalent surcharges for credit-card pay-
ments.
2
 Both sides appealed to insights about consumer behavior. On the one 
hand, believing that individuals are affected by bounded rationality,
3
 behavioral-
economics scholars criticized the New York statute as an attempt to “bias[] con-
sumers toward credit-card use.”
4
 On the other hand, law-and-economics schol-
ars—endorsing the assumption that consumers are fully rational and act to max-
imize expected utility
5
—dismissed the impact of the two different pricing 
schemes.
6
 Both sides understandably agreed that there was no quantitative dif-
ference between equivalent cash discounts and credit-card surcharges. But they 
disagreed on whether consumers’ responses to the negative frame—that is, the 
 
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 
(2017) (No. 15-1391). 
2. Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1144. 
3. See, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON, AN EMPIRICALLY BASED MICROECONOMICS 17-18 (1997) (arguing 
that human behavior is founded on “incomplete and inaccurate knowledge about the conse-
quences of actions” as well as limited information-processing capabilities). 
4. Brief of Scholars of Behavioral Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, 
Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (No. 15-1391), 2016 WL 6994874. 
5. See Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1551, 1551 (1998) (“For example, a rational person who wants to keep warm will compare the 
alternative means known to him of keeping warm in terms of . . . utility and disutility, and 
will choose from this array the means that achieves warmth with the greatest margin of benefit 
over cost . . . .”). 
6. Brief of Amici Curiae International Center for Law & Economics & Scholars of Law & Eco-
nomics in Support of Respondents at 2, Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (No. 15-1391), 
2016 WL 7438451. 
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credit-card surcharge, which primes the additional costs of credit-card use—dif-
fered from their reactions to the positive frame—the cash discount. In short, they 
disagreed on the framing effect.
7
 
Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court tabled the debate. The Court implicitly 
accepted that merchants might have some reasons to prefer one kind of pricing 
scheme over the other.
8
 The Court, however, did not address how the regulatory 
state ought to interact with behavioral economics. Rather, it remanded the case 
to the Second Circuit for a decision on whether the no-surcharge law is permis-
sible, either as a regulation of commercial speech or as a disclosure requirement, 
or is instead an unconstitutional curtailment of First Amendment rights.
9
 
Outside of the courts, in the consumer-protection literature, the battle lines 
have been similarly drawn. On the one hand, behavioral-economics scholars ar-
gue that, because there is no neutral way of conveying information, the govern-
ment should improve people’s welfare by influencing their decision-making 
through paternalistically framed regulatory disclosures.
10
 Rational-choice theo-
rists, on the other hand, object to most administrative regulations as attempts to 
interfere with rational people’s autonomy to make decisions about their own 
utility.
11
 Scholars view this disagreement as a zero-sum game.
12
 And entire 




7. Deborah Frisch, Reasons for Framing Effects, 54 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 399, 399 (1993) (“The term ‘framing effect’ refers to the finding that subjects often 
respond differently to different descriptions of the same problem.”). 
8. See, e.g., Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1149 n.1; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra 
note 1, at 10. 
9. Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1150-52. 
10. See, e.g., Judith Lichtenberg, For Your Own Good: Informing, Nudging, Coercing, 14 GEO. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 663, 667-69 (2016) (“Despite talk about ‘full information,’ in the real world, in-
formation is always partial and incomplete . . . . In the real world the distinction between 
informing people and nudging them almost always breaks down.”). 
11. See, e.g., RICCARDO REBONATO, TAKING LIBERTIES: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF LIBERTARIAN 
PATERNALISM 153-87 (2012); MARK D. WHITE, THE MANIPULATION OF CHOICE: ETHICS AND 
LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 81-102 (2013). 
12. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE 
L.J. 1826 (2013) (making the case for libertarian paternalism and discussing autonomy-based 
and welfarist objections to paternalism). 
13. Compare SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM (2013), 
with REBONATO, supra note 11. See also, e.g., Bruce Ian Carlin et al., Libertarian Paternalism, 
Information Production, and Financial Decision-Making, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 2204 (2013); Ed-
ward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (2006); Joshua D. Wright 
& Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implica-
tions for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 1075-80 (2012). 
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This Note argues that, in many settings, the dichotomy is overstated. Ad-
ministrative regulations can take a different approach, one that is neither pater-
nalistic nor libertarian. That is, they can offer dual, or mixed, frames. Mixed 
framing juxtaposes both positive and negative frames, providing seemingly re-
dundant yet neutral information through mathematically equivalent frames. In 
other words, mixed framing is an improved, more complete disclosure require-
ment. The recent debate in the Expressions Hair Design litigation exemplifies this 
approach. In that case, a mixed frame would amount to something like this: 
“$10.00 (cash) / $11.00 (credit-card),” “$10.00 (cash) / 10% extra for credit 
card,” or “$10.00 (cash) / $1 extra for credit card.” The legality of one or more 
of these mixed-framing pricing schemes was the exact question that, on remand 




But courts are not the only ones who have yet to grapple with mixed framing. 
In fact, virtually no one has studied the concept.
15
 And consumer-protection 
scholars have yet to fully acknowledge its regulatory potential—let alone notice 
that our administrative state currently relies on this tool. Surprisingly, indeed, 
we encounter this framing tool every day in our grocery stores.
16
 
Mixed framing deserves more attention than it has received. Offering the 
first systematic empirical analysis of the impact of mixed framing on consumer 
products,
17
 this Note recognizes that there is something intrinsically valuable 
about mixed frames. That “something” comes to light when focusing on the 
most elegant and mathematically clean example of mixed frames: “75% fat- 
 
14. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 877 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that 
“a merchant complies with [New York law] if and only if the merchant posts the total dollars-
and-cents price charged to credit card users,” whether as a single-sticker price or as part of a 
dual pricing scheme), certified question answered, 117 N.E.3d 730, 737 (N.Y. 2018). 
15. Porismita Borah, Conceptual Issues in Framing Theory: A Systematic Examination of a Decade’s 
Literature, 61 J. COMM. 246, 257 (2011) (“[T]here is very little research examining the influence 
of multiple frames and results from the present study show that 3.2% of the studies examined 
mixed frames.”); Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, A Theory of Framing and Opinion 
Formation in Competitive Elite Environments, 57 J. COMM. 99, 101 (2007) (“The role of multiple 
competing frames . . . has gone largely unexplored.”). There are only a handful of medical 
studies discussing mixed frames. See infra notes 67-76. 
16. See infra notes 114-120 and accompanying text (outlining the use of mixed framing on ground-
meat labels). 
17. Only one thirty-year-old study on the framing of food attributes devoted a few sentences to 
discussing mixed frames. See Richard D. Johnson, Making Judgments when Information Is Miss-
ing: Inferences, Biases, and Framing Effects, 66 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 69, 73-77 (1987) (summa-
rizing the data from a small and unrepresentative sample of sixty college students). 
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free / 25% fat” food labels. Mixed frames can communicate more complete in-
formation without nudging consumers in a particular direction, thus appealing 
to the antipaternalist sentiment in favor of preserving consumer autonomy. And, 
in a proconsumer fashion, they can reduce the volatile and misleading effects of 
single frames. This Note’s empirical analysis shows that mixed framing can have 
a discernible impact on consumer behavior and that percentage labeling of food 
products is an excellent area to introduce mixed-framing requirements for the 
disclosure of information. 
By focusing on mixed framing, this Note takes a step back from the pater-
nalism/libertarianism debate. In many instances,
18
 more paternalistic ap-
proaches resulting from the application of behavioral insights to law and eco-
nomics might be normatively appealing.
19
 In others, however, they might be 
overkill. This Note is more agnostic about the identity of consumers’ preferences 
or the way in which behavioral biases operate. To regulate efficiently and effec-
tively, agencies often don’t have to paternalistically settle those debates and burn 
political capital. Instead, in many circumstances, agencies should acknowledge 
the limits of human cognition isolated by behavioral economists, while adopting 
an approach that stays clear of both paternalism and libertarianism. 
The concept of debiasing through mixed framing, this Note argues, is that 
novel approach.
20
 In a nutshell, when regulating how manufacturers voluntarily 
elect to convey information to consumers through a percentage statement, the 
government should both facilitate the provision of complete, neutral infor-
mation and maximize consumer autonomy by requiring the disclosure of the 
complementary frame—thus creating a mixed frame. 
The Note proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the behavioral-economics  
theories of framing that will inform the rest of my analysis. Part II discusses the 
regulation of food labeling as a case study for this Note’s novel approach to dis-
closure requirements. Through the first systematic attempt at uncovering the 
history of food regulation in the context of percentage statements, I focus on a 
 
18. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 211 
(2006) (explaining that if women “underestimate the value of engaging in recommended self-
examinations” to detect breast cancer, there is value in “framing the recommendation to self-
examine in terms of losses rather than gains” in order to “increase the probability they attach 
to benefiting from a self-examination and thus . . . counteract optimism bias”). 
19. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Eco-
nomics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473-75 (1998). 
20. I use the term “debiasing” to describe a process that, through neutral and complete infor-
mation, reduces cognitive biases and enhances the accuracy of consumers’ factual beliefs. Cf. 
Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 202 (discussing how debiasing through substantive law is a 
targeted approach, with the goal of pushing boundedly rational individuals in a particular 
direction). 
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rather unique phenomenon—mixed frames—that can be observed in the regu-
latory toolbox of one administrative agency. Because mixed frames have been 
understudied by behavioral economists and overlooked by legal scholars, I ana-
lyze the effects of mixed frames through an original between-subjects study. Re-
lying on those empirical results, Part III maps out the analytic and normative 
case for why regulators, in cases like food labeling (where a single method of 
framing information must be chosen), should mandate the use of mixed frames. 
Part IV argues that, through a process of debiasing through mixed framing, 
agencies can promulgate disclosure requirements that minimize the risk of mis-
leading and deceptive advertising tactics without running afoul of the First 
Amendment or falling into paternalistic restrictions on consumers’ freedom. A 
brief conclusion follows, setting out a schematic agenda for further behavioral 
law-and-economics research on mixed framing. 
i .  attribute framing  
The goal of this Part is to set the stage for a simple claim that should guide 
our approach to regulation: framing affects rational people’s behavior. But not 
all frames are created equal, and some frames are more neutral than others.
21
 In 
the face of the rational volatility of different frames, this Note will show that—
both empirically and normatively—mixed framing emerges as the superior ap-
proach to administrative regulation of attribute disclosures. 
First, I survey the behavioral scholarship on attribute frames. Section I.A 
simply makes the descriptive argument that the impact of frames on cognition 
cannot be ignored. It deliberately avoids delving into the potential biases that 
may lead to disparate behavior in response to positive, negative, or mixed frames. 
And it does not analyze whether framing effects obfuscate or promote one’s true 
preferences. Those considerations are beyond the scope of this Note. 
Second, Section I.B introduces the concept of mixed framing and discusses 
the few studies that have included a mixed-framing condition, mostly limited to 
the medical literature. Part II will update those studies and expand on their con-
clusions through the analysis of original empirical data on consumer preferences. 
 
21. Cf. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 125 (1945) (“All animals are equal but some animals are 
more equal than others.”). 
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A. The Behavioral Economics of Attribute Framing 
People do not always make choices solely based on their economic conse-
quences.
22
 Studies have repeatedly shown how individuals, depending on the 
way they process the information available to them, make judgments that con-
form or depart from expected rationality. In 1980, for instance, long before Ex-
pressions Hair Design, Richard Thaler noted that the credit-card industry had 
lobbied legislators to have any price differential between cash and credit-card 
purchases labeled as a “cash discount” rather than a “credit-card surcharge”; by 
framing the price difference as a gain rather than a loss, Thaler explained, con-
sumers would be more likely to use credit cards.
23
 This is not surprising: patients 
are more likely to undergo an operation if they are told that 90% of patients live 
through the postoperative period than if they are told that 10% die during that 
same time frame.
24
 And, similarly, cold cuts labeled “90% fat-free” appear more 
appealing than those labeled “10% fat.”
25
 Though these findings contradict tra-
ditional rational-choice theory, it is now broadly recognized that behavior is in-
fluenced by how information is conveyed.
26
 “The definition of rationality as co-
herence is impossibly restrictive.”
27
 
Realizing the inadequacy of the neoclassical economic model, psychologists 
and behavioral economists have agreed that consumers enjoy bounded rationality 
and are influenced by the framing of information. Herbert Simon introduced the 
concept of bounded rationality to counteract the neoclassical idea of “global ra-
tionality,” which “assumes that the decision maker has a comprehensive, con-
sistent utility function, knows all the alternatives that are available for choice, 
can compute the expected value of utility associated with each alternative, and 
chooses the alternative that maximizes expected utility.”
28
 Bounded rationality, 
instead, finds the foundation of human behavior in “incomplete and inaccurate 
 
22. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges.gov: Behaviorally Informed Regulation, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 719, 725 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teich-
man eds., 2014). 
23. Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 45 
(1980). 
24. Donald A. Redelmeier et al., Understanding Patients’ Decisions: Cognitive and Emotional Perspec-
tives, 270 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 72, 73 (1993). 
25. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 88 (2011). 
26. See, e.g., Irwin P. Levin et al., All Frames Are Not Created Equal: A Typology and Critical Analysis 
of Framing Effects, 76 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 149, 150 (1998) 
(describing the role of framing effects in studies across a variety of fields). 
27. KAHNEMAN, supra note 25, at 411. 
28. SIMON, supra note 3, at 17. 
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knowledge about the consequences of actions” as well as limited information-
processing capabilities.
29




Elaborating on Simon’s concept of bounded rationality, some behavioral 
economists advanced a theory of construction of preference.
31
 Paul Slovic argued 
that “preferences are not simply read off some master list but are constructed on 
the spot by an adaptive decision maker” through a series of cognitive tools that 
boundedly rational consumers use to make decisions.
32
 In other words, “con-
sumer-preference formation may be more like architecture, building some de-
fensible set of values, rather than like archaeology, uncovering values that are 
already there.”
33
 These “mental gymnastics” cast decision-making as “a highly 




Slovic’s theory was in large part influenced by Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky’s foundational work on prospect theory.
35
 Kahneman and Tversky 
showed how boundedly rational decision makers often choose based on “mental 
representations of the options, not the objective states of the world.”
36
 In partic-
ular, equivalent ways of presenting information, which would otherwise appear 
inconsequential and normatively irrelevant, have a recognizable impact on hu-
man decisions; for example, and most famously, decision makers value prospec-
tive gains and losses differently.
37
 
Taking prospect theory as a starting point, a large body of research has 
shown how framing equivalent information in different ways (be they positive 
or negative) can influence decision-making. Framing effects suggest that people 
 
29. Id. at 18. 
30. JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 140-41 (1958). 
31. See generally THE CONSTRUCTION OF PREFERENCE (Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic eds., 
2006) (collecting numerous works from different disciplines on the construction of prefer-
ences). 
32. Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preference, 50 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 364, 369 (1995). 
33. James R. Bettman et al., Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 187, 188 
(1998). 
34. Slovic, supra note 32, at 369. 
35. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
36. Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preference: An Overview, in THE CON-
STRUCTION OF PREFERENCE, supra note 31, at 1, 23. 
37. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 
SCIENCE 453, 457-58 (1981). 
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choose “between descriptions of options rather than between the options them-
selves.”
38
 Particularly relevant to my research is the phenomenon of attribute 
framing—framing a single attribute in one of multiple logically equivalent ways, 
which can result in different behavioral outcomes.
39
 “Attribute framing repre-
sents perhaps the simplest case of framing, making it especially useful for gain-
ing a basic understanding of how descriptive valence influences information pro-
cessing.”
40
 In all instances in which equivalent information is provided with 
different valences, alternatives are rated more favorably if framed positively.
41
 
Most commonly, these studies have focused on the impact of framing the same 
situation in equivalent success or failure rates. Studies have examined the effects 


















—and the list goes on. 
Though these results have often been conflated with those obtained under risky 
choices (described by the endowment effect
50
), risk is not at all a necessary com-
ponent of attribute framing. 
 
38. Amos Tversky, Contrasting Rational and Psychological Principles of Choice, in WISE CHOICES: 
DECISIONS, GAMES, AND NEGOTIATIONS 5, 7 (Richard J. Zeckhauser et al. eds., 1996). 
39. See Levin et al., supra note 26, at 158-59 (explaining and graphically demonstrating the “at-
tribute framing paradigm”). 
40. Id. at 158. 
41. Id. at 161-63. 
42. See James R. Bettman & Mita Sujan, Effects of Framing on Evaluation of Comparable and 
Noncomparable Alternatives by Expert and Novice Consumers, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 141 (1987). 
43. See Margaret A. Neale et al., The Framing of Negotiations: Contextual Versus Task Frames, 39 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 228 (1987). 
44. See Vandra L. Huber et al., Decision Bias and Personnel Selection Strategies, 40 ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 136 (1987). 
45. See William J. Qualls & Christopher P. Puto, Organizational Climate and Decision Framing: An 
Integrated Approach to Analyzing Industrial Buying Decisions, 26 J. MARKETING RES. 179 (1989). 
46. See Irwin P. Levin et al., How Information Frame Influences Risky Decisions: Between-Subjects and 
Within-Subject Comparisons, 8 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 43 (1987). 
47. See Thomas S. Bateman & Carl P. Zeithaml, The Psychological Context of Strategic Decisions: A 
Test of Relevance to Practitioners, 10 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 587 (1989). 
48. See Kenneth J. Dunegan, Framing, Cognitive Modes, and Image Theory: Toward an Understand-
ing of a Glass Half Full, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 491 (1993). 
49. See Patricia W. Linville et al., AIDS Risk Perceptions and Decision Biases, in THE SOCIAL PSY-
CHOLOGY OF HIV INFECTION 5 (John B. Pryor & Glenn D. Reeder eds., 1993). 
50. The endowment effect describes “the fact that people often demand much more to give up an 
object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it.” Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: 
The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 194 (1991). 
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Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein’s groundbreaking work, Debiasing Through 
Law, applies these behavioral insights to law and economics.
51
 Notably, Jolls and 
Sunstein argue that consumer-protection laws should aim at debiasing. “[I]n 
some cases it may be desirable to understand or to reform the substance of law—
not merely the procedures by which the law is applied in an adjudicative set-
ting—with an eye toward debiasing those who suffer from bounded rational-
ity.”
52
 They contend that if innate biases are alleviated or neutralized, consumers 
may make better decisions.
53
 In the context of product-attribute framing in par-
ticular, Jolls and Sunstein suggest that the government may require that retailers 
“identify the potential negative consequences associated with their product . . . 




Jolls and Sunstein’s succinct exposition of debiasing through framing ap-
peals to many—including myself. Suppose that women “underestimate the value 
of engaging in recommended self-examinations” to detect breast cancer.
55
 “If so, 
then framing the recommendation to self-examine in terms of losses rather than 
gains should increase the probability they attach to benefiting from a self-exam-
ination and thus should counteract optimism bias.”
56
 In other words, debiasing 
through framing is a way of addressing people’s factually inaccurate underesti-
mation by nudging them in the opposite direction; it alleviates natural biases 
(such as optimism bias) that lead people astray. 
But Jolls and Sunstein’s brief discussion of debiasing through framing does 
not set out to offer a universalizable approach for debiasing regulation. Rather, 
it only identifies its necessary starting point. Jolls and Sunstein recognize the 
problem of innate human biases that exist in the absence of any disclosure, and 
their solution is requiring manufacturers to provide some disclosures. But out-
side of their relatively uncontroversial example of breast cancer it is not clear why 
the government should favor one specific type of frame over another, or why 
agencies should even bother with understanding the psychological processes be-
hind human thinking let alone bother with mandating the use of particular 
frames. Often, decisional environments are significantly more complex than Jolls 
and Sunstein’s example, as is the political economy. It is in those contexts that 
 
51. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 18 (arguing that the law should be used to steer decision mak-
ers in more rational directions). 
52. Id. at 202. 
53. Id. at 226. 
54. Id. at 216. 




mixed framing and regulation targeted at the way in which manufacturers vol-
untarily disclose information is a compelling solution. 
B. Mixed Framing: An Understudied Phenomenon 
Beyond studies on the effect of single frames, only a small number of scholars 
have focused on other types of framing environments—for example, competing 
frames.
57
 Competing frames are framing tools that combine two contrasting 
ways of framing the same information. Framing studies “have neglected the fact 
that frames are themselves contestable[,] . . . instead restrict[ing] attention to 
situations in which citizens are artificially sequestered.”
58
 But in thinking about 
real-world events, people often have to evaluate competing frames—a rally as an 
exercise of free speech or a threat to public safety, for example.
59
 Yet the scholar-
ship in this potentially rich sphere of research is scarce.
60
 A survey of almost four 
hundred peer-reviewed framing articles published between 1997 and 2007 found 
only a dozen pieces discussing competing frames.
61
  
This Note addresses a particular subset of competing frames: what I refer to 
as mixed (attribute) frames.
62
 Mixed frames, unlike competing frames more gen-
erally, manipulate single attributes of a product in terms of percentages. The 
frame components have the special property of not only competing with one an-
other but also being mathematically and logically equivalent. Unlike competing 
 
57. See, e.g., Porismita Borah, Seeking More Information and Conversations: Influence of Competitive 
Frames and Motivated Processing, 38 COMM. RES. 303 (2011) (including a study group in which 
participants were exposed to a frame portraying a KKK rally as both a free speech issue and a 
public-safety issue); Paul R. Brewer, Values, Political Knowledge, and Public Opinion About Gay 
Rights: A Framing-Based Account, 67 PUB. OPINION Q. 173 (2003) (exposing subjects to both 
the equality and morality frames on the issue of LGBT rights); Dennis Chong & James N. 
Druckman, Framing Public Opinion in Competitive Democracies, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 637 
(2007) (evaluating judgments of a hate rally based on a free speech and public-safety frame, 
as well as judgments about urban growth based on “preserv[ing] open space” and “economic 
costs” frames); Paul M. Sniderman & Sean M. Theriault, The Structure of Political Argument 
and the Logic of Issue Framing, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC OPINION 133 (Willem E. Saris & Paul M. 
Sniderman eds., 2004) (evaluating government spending based on “getting ahead” and 
“higher taxes” frames). 
58. Sniderman & Theriault, supra note 57, at 141. 
59. See Chong & Druckman, supra note 57, at 641-42.  
60. See, e.g., Chong & Druckman, supra note 15, at 101 (“The role of multiple competing frames 
. . . has gone largely unexplored.”).  
61. Borah, supra note 15, at 254, 257 (2011). 
62. It is important to note that some, including Porismita Borah, unhelpfully use the terms “com-
peting frames” and “mixed frames” as synonyms. See Borah, supra note 57, at 305-06.  
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frames, then, mixed frames do not hide the ball: they do not appeal to rhetorical 
tools (pulling subjects in opposing directions by emphasizing the tension be-
tween public safety and free speech, for instance). Rather, they provide all of the 
necessary information in impartial and neutral mathematical terms—say, 10% 
mortality and 90% survival. For this reason, mixed framing is a potentially pow-
erful approach: “If attribute frames trigger similarly valenced associations, 
mixed frames might dampen or altogether attenuate framing effects compared 
to purely positive or negative frames”;
63
 they might “push people in conflicting 
directions,” or elicit “a more careful evaluation . . . of competing alternatives.”
64
 
Surprisingly few researchers have been drawn to mixed frames, resulting in 
a mere handful of scholarly publications tangentially discussing mixed framing 
over the last forty years. What is more, studies on mixed framing have almost all 
been limited to the medical literature, and there is little consensus among 
them.
65
 Results for mixed frames in the medical-treatment context have some-
times (though not always) fallen between those of purely positive and purely 
negative frames.
66
 Studies also disagree on whether mixed frames are signifi-
cantly different from single frames and whether the order of the mixed frame 
(positive-negative or negative-positive) has any impact on patient behavior.  
The medical-treatment literature on mixed frames can be surveyed quickly. 
In decisions between cancer treatments based on survival rates, Annette O’Con-
nor and her colleagues consistently found no difference resulting from the order 
of the mixed frames.
67
 But, although one of her studies concluded that mixed 
frames are significantly different from negative frames—producing intermediate 
results that often fall in between those of purely negative and purely positive 
 
63. Cabral A. Bigman et al., Effective or Ineffective: Attribute Framing and the Human Papillomavirus 
(HPV) Vaccine, 81S PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING S70, S72 (2010).  
64. Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Framing Theory, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 103, 113 (2007).  
65. See Bigman et al., supra note 63; infra notes 67-76 (citing six articles from the medical litera-
ture that include mixed frame conditions). 
66. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.  
67. Annette M. O’Connor, Effects of Framing and Level of Probability on Patients’ Preferences for Can-
cer Chemotherapy, 42 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 119, 120 (1989) (asking a mix of healthy and 
sick subjects to choose between a toxic and a nontoxic cancer treatment under one of three 
randomly assigned framing conditions: (i) probability of surviving after chemotherapy; (ii) 
probability of dying; and (iii) mixed frames); Annette M. Cormier O’Connor et al., Eliciting 
Preferences for Alternative Cancer Drug Treatments: The Influence of Framing, Medium, and Rater 
Variables, 5 MED. DECISION MAKING 453, 460 (1985) (asking visitors to the Ontario Cancer 
Institute and university nursing students to respond to a treatment-choice questionnaire un-
der one of four randomly assigned framing conditions: (i) probability of surviving the first 
year after treatment; (ii) probability of dying; (iii) probability of living and probability of 





—her other study found no intermediate results.
69
 In the context of pa-
tient preferences between surgery and radiation therapy based on survival rates, 
Barbara McNeil, Stephen Pauker, and Amos Tversky
 
observed that mixed frames
 
“produced intermediate results,” approximating those of the negative frame 
(with potential differences based on gender).
70
  
Three more recent studies have perpetuated these discordant results. James 
Druckman offered a variation on Kahneman and Tversky’s famous avian-flu vi-
gnette
71
 by testing the impact of a mixed frame.
72
 He concluded that, even 
though the order of the mixed frame did not matter, mixed framing led to inter-
mediate results that were statistically different from both single frames.
73
 Cabral 
Bigman and colleagues examined the impact of mixed frames on the perceived 
effectiveness of the human papilloma virus vaccine.
74
 In contrast to prior re-
search, the order of the mixed frame seemed to have a distinct effect, and mixed 
frames were statistically different from positive frames.
75
 Ellen Peters, Sol Hart, 
and Liana Fraenkel looked at preferences regarding drugs for debilitating head-
aches. Using a mixed frame for side effects led to intermediate results that were 




68. O’Connor et al., supra note 67, at 459-60. 
69. O’Connor, supra note 67, at 123. 
70. Barbara J. McNeil, Stephen G. Pauker & Amos Tversky, On the Framing of Medical Decisions, 
in DECISION MAKING: DESCRIPTIVE, NORMATIVE, AND PRESCRIPTIVE INTERACTIONS 562, 564-
65 (David E. Bell et al. eds., 1988) (asking medical-student subjects to choose between radi-
otherapy and surgery under one of three randomly assigned framing conditions: (i) survival 
rates; (ii) mortality rates; and (iii) morality rates and survival rates). 
71. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 37, at 453 (describing the hypothetical outbreak of “an unu-
sual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people,” and observing differences in indi-
vidual preferences over how to fight that disease based on the framing of the proposed cure’s 
effects).  
72. James N. Druckman, Evaluating Framing Effects, 22 J. ECON. PSYCH. 91 (2001) (assigning 320 
student participants from a large U.S. public university randomly to one of three conditions: 
(i) disease survival rate; (ii) mortality rate; and (iii) survival and mortality data). 
73. Id. at 96-98.  
74. Bigman et al., supra note 63, at S72-S73 (asking randomly selected subjects participating in 
the monthly Annenberg National Health Communication Survey to assess the vaccine’s effec-
tiveness based on a statement which included one of five randomly assigned framing condi-
tions: (i) effective against human papilloma virus (HPV) strains that cause 70% of cervical 
cancers; (ii) ineffective against HPV strains that cause 30% of cervical cancers; (iii) a control 
condition; (iv) effectiveness and ineffectiveness rates; and (v) ineffectiveness and effectiveness 
rates). 
75. Id. at S74.  
76. Ellen Peters, P. Sol Hart & Liana Fraenkel, Informing Patients: The Influence of Numeracy, Fram-
ing, and Format of Side Effect Information on Risk Perceptions, 2011 MED. DECISION MAKING 432, 
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Schematically, the disagreement in the medical literature can be summarized 
as follows: 
TABLE 1. 
MEDICAL LITERATURE ON MIXED FRAMING 
Author Intermediate? Difference from  
single frames? 
Order matters? 




















Peters et al. (2011) Yes No N/A 
  
Putting to one side their internal disagreement, these results are certainly 
informative. But there is reason to be skeptical of their relevance for administra-
tive regulation of consumer goods. Beyond their failure to present a uniform 
picture, many medical-treatment studies do not rely on experimental procedures 
typical of behavioral studies of attribute framing (namely, between-subjects de-
sign). There are two other grounds for skepticism.  
First, framing effects in the medical literature are either risky-choice frames 
or goal frames, and different medical studies involve different levels of risk. 
While risky-choice framing manipulates all options with different risk levels (af-
fecting the frequency of choosing the riskier option), goal framing frames only 
the consequences of a particular behavior (shifting the rate of adopting a certain 
behavior).
77
 By contrast, attribute framing manipulates a single attribute of a 
 
433 (asking online subjects, who were asked to imagine having severe headaches, for their 
impressions of an analgesic whose side effects were framed under one of three randomly as-
signed framing conditions: (i) percentage (or frequency) of patients getting side effect; (ii) 
percentage (or frequency) of patients not getting the side effects; and (iii) mixed frame).  
77. Levin et al., supra note 26, at 181. 
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product by labeling it positively or negatively (for example, ground beef labeled 
75% lean or 25% fat), which affects that product’s attractiveness rating.
78
  
Second, framing effects in the medical literature and those in consumer prod-
ucts are explained by an appeal to different types of biases. Because they are often 
connected with emotionally salient outcomes (such as probability of death or 
pain), negative frames in medical studies are likely to loom larger than negative 
frames in food labeling. And, depending on the outcome at stake (discomfort, 
pain, death), the emotions invoked will be stronger or weaker. Indeed, while 
risky-choice framing is usually explained by an appeal to risk aversion or risk 
seeking,
79
 goal framing relies on the endowment effect and loss aversion.
80
 The 
same cannot be said for a distinction between 5% fat and 95% fat-free yogurt. 
Attribute framing works differently. Unlike the other types of framing, it is 
“likely to influence the encoding and representation of information in associative 
memory”—causing, for example, positive frames to evoke favorable associations 
in the consumer’s mind.
81
 
Outside of the medical literature, in the realm of consumer protection, only 
one study has tangentially investigated the “unexplored topic” of mixed fram-
ing.
82
 In that experiment, conducted thirty years ago with the help of a cohort of 
college students, Richard Johnson found that mixed frames did not lead to inter-
mediate results,
83
 that mixed frames approximated positive frames,
84
 and that 
the order of the mixed frame (negative-positive or positive-negative) had no im-
pact.
85
 Surprisingly, until now, no further empirical study of the effect of mixed 
framing on consumer behavior had been conducted. 
Johnson’s limited set of thirty-year-old data is of little help for modern-day 
consumer regulations. For starters, the study predated all regulations of product 
labels—and therefore subjects were not accustomed to seeing standardized food 
labels or percentage statements on their products.
86
 Moreover, Johnson’s conclu-
 
78. Id. at 159, 181. 
79. Id. at 152-58. 
80. Id. at 168, 177; see also Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental 
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1326–29 (1990) 
(defining the endowment effect as a manifestation of loss aversion). 
81. Levin et al., supra note 26, at 164.  
82. Johnson, supra note 17, at 73 (looking at how consumers “evaluate ground beef that is de-
scribed as both 20% fat and 80% lean”). 
83. Id. at 73-76.  
84. Id. at 76. 
85. Id. at 77.  
86. See infra Section II.A.  
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sions on mixed framing were based on a small sample of sixty college students.
87
 
And, most importantly, Johnson was not interested in drawing any policy rec-
ommendations from his data and provided a very cursory discussion of mixed 
framing.
88
 To inform mixed-framing regulatory reforms, more work is needed.  
In sum, choices may often be constructed, edited, and framed. But, as Irwin 
Levin and his coauthors have admonished, not all frames are created equal.
89
 In 
other words, the reasons why risky-choice frames and goal frames in medical 
literature and attribute frames in consumer-products regulations “cannot and 
should not be treated the same” are “apparent”—and “[n]ot recognizing the dis-
tinctions leads to unwarranted comparisons.”
90
 Because there is a lack of agree-
ment on the nature and impact of mixed frames, and because framing effects in 
the consumer-protection context differ from those in the medical context, a thor-
ough study of mixed frames in consumer products is warranted. Part II will do 
just that, setting the foundations for this Note’s claim that legal scholars often 
overstate the paternalism/libertarianism dichotomy in consumer protection. 
i i .  mixed framing: a case study  
Behavioral economists may suggest a host of biases to explain how different 
attribute frames cause discrepant results. But the objective of this Note is not to 
focus on explaining consumer behavior. Explanations aside, people do behave 
differently in response to different but complementary frames, as Part I estab-
lished. 
Given that, what should administrative agencies do? The economic costs of 
asymmetric information are well known,
91
 and thus product labeling may en-
hance economic efficiency.
92
 Because consistency in the market of goods in-
creases information accuracy and allows manufacturers to differentiate them-
selves from one another through easy labeling comparisons, the government is 
 
87. Johnson, supra note 17, at 73-74 (explaining how the 180 students that participated in this 
study were randomly divided into six groups of thirty students each, and only two of those 
groups—a control group and a study group—were exposed to mixed framing). 
88. Id. at 76-77.  
89. See Levin et al., supra note 26. 
90. Id. at 178.  
91. See generally George A. Akerloff, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (explaining the importance of distinguishing good 
products from bad ones in structuring economic institutions). 
92. See Elise Golan et al., Economics of Food Labeling, 24 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 117, 127 (2001) (“La-
beling decisions may enhance economic efficiency by helping consumers to target expendi-
tures toward products they most want.”). 
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often called upon to regulate.
93
 And the argument that agencies should choose 
the framing that allows consumers to make “rational” choices and points them 
in the direction of their true (utility-maximizing) preference is certainly appeal-
ing. 
This debate is not an easy one to settle. Traditional rational-choice theory 
sees no harm in the fact that, “[a]bsent regulatory barriers, sellers will tell con-
sumers about product attributes that consumers desire,”
94
 hoping to increase 
profits and extract consumer surplus. But behavioral-economics scholars have 
highlighted the need for new regulatory strategies that take into account con-
sumer behavior.
95
 Thus far, the literature has been unable to move past the pa-
ternalism/libertarianism dichotomy and offer politically feasible regulatory pro-
posals.
96
 This is because behavioral economics has presumed the inevitability of 
paternalism: there is no such thing as a neutral way of conveying information.
97
 
And, in turn, rational-choice theory has criticized those regulations as infringe-
ments on consumer autonomy.
98
 
This Part begins to sketch a rejoinder: in regulating how the market freely 
chooses to disclose information, agencies can promulgate neutral information 
through disclosure requirements that do not infringe on consumers’ autonomy 
by nudging them in a particular direction. Next, I map out this argument by 
noting some of the analytic attributes of a regulatory approach that are observa-
ble in the current administrative state but have gone unnoticed by regulators and 
scholars alike. Mixed frames minimize the distortive and volatile impact of fram-
ing effects (aimed at extracting consumer surplus) and enhance consumer au-
tonomy (by maximizing information completeness), without forcing the gov-
 
93. See Brian E. Roe et al., The Economics of Voluntary Versus Mandatory Labels, 6 ANN. REV. RE-
SOURCE ECON. 407, 409 (2014) (“[P]roduct labeling is an increasingly popular tool of regula-
tors.”). 
94. J. Howard Beales III, Health Related Claims, the Market for Information, and the First Amend-
ment, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 7, 9-10 (2011). 
95. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to 
Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259 (2000) (suggesting an enterprise-
liability approach for manufacturers who manipulate consumers into purchasing and using 
hazardous products); Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1309, 1312 (2015) (proposing a performance-based approach to consumer law under which 
firms would be penalized for failing to meet consumer-expectation benchmarks and rewarded 
for exceeding them). 
96. See generally Sunstein, supra note 12 (discussing autonomy-based and welfarist objections to 
paternalism). 
97. See, e.g., Lichtenberg, supra note 10, at 667-69. 
98. See, e.g., REBONATO, supra note 11, at 200-05; WHITE, supra note 11, at 81-102. 
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ernment to take a normative position on which single frame is preferable. Mixed 
frames, in sum, foster more informed, autonomous decision-making. 
Rather than discussing the benefits of mixed framing and the shortcomings 
of single framing in the abstract, or conjecturing about the dual-pricing scheme 
discussed in Expressions Hair Design,
99
 I begin from a concrete case study: per-
cent fat-free regulations. For decades, federal food-safety regulators have man-
dated mixed frames for certain meat products whenever manufacturers wish to 
present fat-content information at all. This understudied phenomenon serves as 
a jumping-off point for this Note’s normative discussion in Part III. 
Section II.A provides the first overview of the little-known history of gov-
ernmental regulation of percent fat-free and percent lean statements. From this 
history, three sets of considerations emerge: concerns over consumer deception, 
administrative interests in disclosing accurate information, and industry cus-
toms. The interaction of these considerations reveals the inherent problems of 
single framing. The next Part, Part III, develops out of the original behavioral 
survey on mixed framing discussed in Section II.B and advances an argument 
for mixed-framing regulation. 
A. The History of Agency Regulation of Percent Fat-Free Statements 
During the 1970s, the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
100
 were largely opposed to positive attrib-
ute frames. Many manufacturers sought to include statements about the low-fat 
content of their products. At the time, “consumer interest in diet as a way to 
improve health was high,”
101
 and “[f]ood manufacturers were eager to market 




99. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text (discussing the dispute in Expressions Hair Design 
and the certification to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the legality of mixed-fram-
ing and dual-pricing schemes). 
100. As many as fifteen federal agencies administer at least thirty statutes relating to food safety. 
RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22600, THE FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM: A 
PRIMER 1 (2016). But the two primary federal regulatory bodies are the FDA, within the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, and the FSIS, in the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture. Before 1940, the FDA and FSIS were housed in the same department. See Richard A. 
Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing Federal Food Safety Regulation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 
61, 82-83 (2011). Today, while the FSIS regulates meat and meat products, the FDA has juris-
diction over all other foods. See JOHNSON, supra, at 2. 
101. Christine Lewis Taylor & Virginia L. Wilkening, How the Nutrition Food Label Was Developed, 
Part 1: The Nutrition Facts Panel, 108 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 437, 437 (2008) (describing the 




As consensus that limiting dietary fat intake was beneficial continued to 
build, mixed frames were introduced in the regulation of some food products.
103
 
At first, mixed frames were prescribed through guidance documents made avail-
able in connection with the FSIS’s label-approval system. As early as 1982, the 
FSIS published a memorandum—seemingly covering all kinds of food prod-
ucts—announcing that “[p]ercent fat free statements, e.g., ‘95% Fat Free’, are 
acceptable on product labels if the label also bears a positive declaration of the 
product’s fat content, e.g., ‘contains 5% fat.’”
104
 That is, percentage fat-free 
statements could be included only as part of a mixed frame. As the FSIS admin-
istrator explained, this policy was “designed to give consumers as much useful 
information as possible on the fat content of the product” and “to assure that 
labels inform consumers exactly what the claim means.”
105
 
In November 1991, both the FDA and FSIS began considering newly pro-
posed rules on percentage statements of fat contents—the FSIS for meat prod-
ucts only
106
 and the FDA for all other food products,
107
 in line with their respec-
tive jurisdictions.
108
 The FDA, believing that “the actual amount of fat in a food 
is a material fact when a ‘___ percent fat-free’ claim is made,” proposed a rule 
“requir[ing] that the disclosure of the amount of total fat in a serving of food 
 
103. See, e.g., DEP’T OF AGRIC. & DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NUTRITION AND YOUR 
HEALTH, DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS 10-12 (1980); DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WEL-
FARE, HEALTHY PEOPLE: THE SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT ON HEALTH PROMOTION AND DIS-
EASE PREVENTION (1979); Lowering Blood Cholesterol to Prevent Heart Disease, NAT’L INSTI-
TUTES HEALTH (Dec. 10-12, 1984), https://consensus.nih.gov/1984/1984cholesterol047html
.htm [https://perma.cc/9VP8-X9XU]. 
104. Memorandum from Standards & Labeling Div., Food Safety & Inspection Serv., to Policy 
Book Subscribers 46 (Jan. 10, 1989), https://ia800205.us.archive.org/8/items
/CAT87890231/CAT87890231.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9WT-KYCY] [hereinafter FSIS 
Memorandum] (referring to the earlier 1982 memorandum). 
105. Donald L. Houston, USDA’s Regulation of Food Claims, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 238, 242 
(1985) (emphasis added). In 1989, the FSIS published another policy memorandum outlin-
ing that any meat or poultry product described as “lean” or “low fat” must also disclose “the 
actual amount of fat.” FSIS Memorandum, supra note 104, at 43. In the case of ground meat, 
moreover, “the actual fat percentage and the lean percentage must either accompany the claim 
[“lean” or “extra lean”] or be referenced by means of an asterisk and placed elsewhere on the 
principal display panel”—as in, for example, “Lean Ground Beef, Contain 80 percent Lean 
and 20 percent Fat.” Id. at 44. 
106. See Nutrition Labeling of Meat and Poultry Products, 56 Fed. Reg. 60302, 60302 (proposed 
Nov. 27, 1991) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 317, 320, 381). 
107. See Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Definition of 
Terms, 56 Fed. Reg. 60421, 60465 (proposed Nov. 27, 1991). 
108. See JOHNSON, supra note 100, at app. A (listing the statutes that define the jurisdiction of 
federal agencies over food-safety regulation). 
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appear in immediate proximity to a ‘___ percent fat-free’ claim.”
109
 Though 
originally not contained in the FSIS proposed rule, the Agency “fully agree[d] 
with [the] FDA’s rationale,” and adopted the FDA’s approach.
110
 In other words, 
at the notice stage, both the FDA and FSIS were leaning toward mixed framing. 
Coordination between the FDA and FSIS was limited to the proposed rule-
makings, and the final rules diverged. On the one hand, the FDA abandoned part 
of its original mixed-framing proposal. It promulgated a requirement that any 
percent fat-free claim be limited to products that meet the “low fat” definition.
111
 
On the other hand, the FSIS adopted the FDA’s original mixed-framing ap-
proach.
112
 The FSIS prohibited percent fat-free claims “in those circumstances 
in which it would be misleading”—that is, in all cases in which the product does 




The FSIS rule had “unintended consequence[s]” on ground-beef prod-
ucts,
114 
which went unaddressed for decades. Because ground meat rarely meets 
the “low fat” criteria, it was “virtually precluded” from using percent lean state-
ments under the 1993 rule.
115
 Yet, manufacturers and retailers had been using 
“‘___percent lean’/‘___percent fat’” labels ever since 1973, when the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture developed the Uniform Retail Meat Identity Stand-
ards.
116
 Notwithstanding the lobbying of trade associations, attempts at address-




109. Food Labeling: “Cholesterol Free,” “Low Cholesterol,” and “___ Percent Fat Free” Claims, 
56 Fed. Reg. 60507, 60511 (proposed Nov. 27, 1991). 
110. Nutrition Labeling of Meat and Poultry Products, 56 Fed. Reg. at 60318. 
111. Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Definition of Terms; 
Definitions of Nutrient Content Claims for the Fat, Fatty Acid, and Cholesterol Content of 
Food, 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2331 (Jan. 6, 1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 5, 101). 
112. Nutrition Labeling of Meat and Poultry Products, 58 Fed. Reg 632, 651 (Jan. 6, 1993) (codified 
as amended at 9 C.F.R. §§ 317.362, 381.462 (2018)). 
113. Id. See generally COMM. ON THE NUTRITION COMPONENTS OF FOOD LABELING, NUTRITION LA-
BELING: ISSUES AND DIRECTIONS FOR THE 1990S, at 171 (Donna V. Porter & Robert O. Earl eds., 
1990) (providing an overview of the factors leading to the FDA’s labeling practices in the 
1990s). 
114. Nutrition Labeling of Ground Beef and Hamburger, 59 Fed. Reg. 26916, 26918 (proposed 
May 24, 1994). 
115. Id. at 26917. 
116. Id. 
117. See, e.g., Nutrition Labeling of Ground Beef and Hamburger: Extension of Compliance Date, 
59 Fed. Reg. 39941 (Aug. 5, 1994) (extending the compliance date indefinitely); Nutrition 
Labeling of Ground Beef and Hamburger, 59 Fed. Reg. 34396 (July 5, 1994) (extending the 
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Eventually, in 2010, the FSIS addressed ground-meat labeling by promulgat-
ing a mixed-framing regulation. Although the FDA’s regulations do not allow 
“percent lean/percent fat” statements,
118
 the FSIS decided to permit mixed 
frames for all ground beef and poultry products, even where they do not meet 
the “low fat” definition.
119
 The Agency was convinced that “percent lean/percent 
fat” claims (or vice versa) would provide consumers with valuable information, 
even though commenters offered conflicting empirical and theoretical evidence 
as to whether percent lean claims would be misleading.
120
 
In this turbulent, three-decade-long process of formal rulemaking, mixed 
frames failed to take root as a standard tool of the regulatory state. Instead, they 
remained a rare exception in food labeling, and they received virtually no atten-
tion from either agencies or legal scholars. But the potential impact of mixed 
framing on novel approaches to policy making, and the questions it raises as a 
way out of the paternalism/libertarianism dichotomy, make this lack of interest 
puzzling. And, to boot, the FDA’s assumptions in rejecting mixed frames are 
subject to a number of critiques. 
Part III, with the aid of empirical data analyzed in Section II.B, will tackle 
each objection to the current FDA approach and systematically engage with the 
analytic and normative attributes of mixed frames. That discussion will take the 
form of a policy proposal, showing why food regulators should embrace mixed 
frames as a tool for effective consumer-oriented regulation. But first, I describe 
my original behavioral survey to demonstrate the likely effects of mixed framing 
in the food-labeling sphere. 
B. An Original Behavioral Survey: Attribute Framing and Percentage 
Statements 
Throughout the 1980s, a series of behavioral studies described in this Section 
painstakingly proved that consumers react to percent fat-free labels differently 
 
comment window until August 22, 1994). The Agency didn’t act on the thousands of com-
ments it received until two days before the inauguration of President Bush in 2001, when it 
issued a new proposal allowing percent fat-free claims as long as a statement of the fat per-
centage was also displayed on the label. Nutrition Labeling of Ground or Chopped Meat and 
Poultry Products and Single-Ingredient Products, 66 Fed. Reg. 4970, 4981 (Jan. 18, 2001). 
118. See Nutrition Labeling of Ground or Chopped Meat and Poultry Products and Single-Ingre-
dient Products, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4981. 
119. See Nutrition Labeling of Single-Ingredient Products and Ground or Chopped Meat and 
Poultry Products, 75 Fed. Reg. 82148, 82167 (proposed Dec. 29, 2010) (to be codified at 9 
C.F.R. § 317.362(f)). 
120. See id. at 82157. 
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than they do to standalone percent fat claims. Yet, regulators largely ignored 
those findings. Instead, in those years, they put into place regulatory schemes 
that were (and remain) internally inconsistent. From the history of attribute 
framing for percent fat statements, mixed frames emerge as the rare exception in 
a system that otherwise gives ample freedom to manufacturers and producers. 
A series of four studies in the 1980s—before food labels were regulated or 
percentage claims had become widespread—focused on the impact of attribute 
framing on consumer choices. In those studies, perceptions of the quality of 
ground beef changed based on whether the meat was described as 75% lean or 
25% fat.
121
 Subjects rated a sample of ground beef as more flavorful and less 
greasy when it was labeled in terms of lean percentage rather than in terms of fat 
percentage, even after tasting it.
122
 Only one study tangentially looked at the 
“unexplored topic” of how consumers “evaluate ground beef that is described as 
both 20% fat and 80% lean.”
123
 Surprisingly, no further empirical study of the 
impact of mixed framing on consumer behavior appears to have been conducted 
until this day. 
In June 2017, on the thirtieth anniversary of the first and only experiment on 
the impact of mixed frames in consumer products, I ran an empirical study 
through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Study participants were divided into four 
randomized groups, each exposed to a different kind of framing. Each group had 
a sample size of about 200 respondents, for a total of around 800 participants, 
drawn from the general U.S. adult population. 
 
121. See Johnson, supra note 17, at 77 (confirming the prediction that “[t]he manner in which the 
quality information was presented, i.e., whether it was framed in terms of fat or lean . . . af-
fect[ed] responses”); Irwin P. Levin, Associative Effects of Information Framing, 25 BULL. PSY-
CHONOMIC SOC’Y 85, 86 (1987) (“Ground beef that was said to be 75% lean was rated as leaner, 
of higher quality, less greasy, and better tasting than beef that was said to be 25% fat.”); Irwin 
P. Levin & Gary J. Gaeth, How Consumers Are Affected by the Framing of Attribute Information 
Before and After Consuming the Product, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 374, 376 (1988) (“[T]he framing 
effect [in terms of fat or lean percentages] tended to be largest when subjects did not actually 
taste the meat, less large when subjects tasted the meat after being given the label, and smallest 
when subjects tasted the meat before being given the label.”); Irwin P. Levin et al., Framing 
Effects in Judgment Tasks with Varying Amounts of Information, 36 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 362, 366 (1985) (conducting a study where “[s]ubjects were asked 
to rate their personal satisfaction with various purchases of ground beef based on the price of 
the meat and its quality” and finding a framing effect depending on whether quality was given 
in terms of percentage lean or percentage fat). 
122. Levin & Gaeth, supra note 121, at 376. 
123. Johnson, supra note 17, at 73. 
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Each participant was paid to answer a short online survey.
124
 The survey in-
cluded five questions about the respondent’s likelihood of purchasing five dif-
ferent products solely based on the information provided. Using a Likert scale,
125
 
respondents estimated their likelihood of purchasing ground beef, yogurt, and 
soup.
126
 Additionally, two nonfood categories were included as controls: gaso-
line (with a cash discount as the positive frame and credit-card surcharge as the 
negative one) and T-shirts (synthetic versus natural fibers). Because of the heav-
ily affect-laden characteristics of the gasoline frames, that control group was ex-
pected to exhibit very different behaviors depending on the framing used. In 
contrast, for T-shirts, the hypothesis was that framing effects would play a minor 
role in consumer preferences because, generally, any negative or positive valence 
associated with a fiber depends on its intended use. 
All of the questions asked of each particular participant group were randomly 
ordered, but they were framed in the same way
127
—employing either (i) purely 
negative (20% fat ground beef), (ii) mixed negative-positive (20% fat and 80% 
fat-free), (iii) mixed positive-negative (80% fat-free and 20% fat), or (iv) purely 
positive (80% fat-free) frames. Limited demographic data, including income, 
gender, employment status, and purchasing habits, were also collected. 
Consistent with decades of literature, I expected that, when presented with 
a positive frame that primed an affect-laden characteristic of a product, a con-
sumer would be more likely to purchase that product than when presented with 
a purely negative frame. Indeed, there was a statistically significant difference 
between the positive framing and the negative framing for ground beef (t =  
-2.17, p < 0.05) and gasoline (t = -8.95, p < 0.001). Soup also had a significant 
difference (t = 2.60, p < 0.01), although framing effects operated in an unex-
pected direction—a point I will return to shortly. Neither the T-shirts group nor 
 
124. Each participant was paid $0.40 for her time. The average time of completion was 2:29 
minutes, which converts to $9.60/hour. Thanks to the Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fund for cov-
ering the costs associated with this survey. 
125. A Likert scale is an ordered scale from which respondents choose one option that best aligns 
with their response. Participants rated their responses by dragging a cursor across a continu-
ous scale of 0 to 100. The scale had both numerical and verbal descriptors. In terms of nu-
merical descriptors, this was an 11-point Likert scale (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 
100); in terms of verbal descriptors, this was a 5-point scale (Extremely Unlikely, between 0 
and 10; Unlikely, between 20 and 30; Neither Unlikely nor Likely, at 50; Likely, between 70 
and 80; Extremely Likely, between 90 and 100). 
126. Respondents were asked to disclose whether they are vegetarian, vegan, pescatarian, lactose 
intolerant, or allergic to food products. If they answered in the affirmative, the following was 
displayed: “For the purpose of this survey, please assume that you are making purchases for 
a close relative with no dietary restrictions.” 
127. All questions were worded in an identical fashion, with the exception of the product being 
tested. For example, in the case of ground beef: “Assume that you would like to buy ground 
beef. Solely based on the information provided below, how likely is it that you will buy it?” 
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the yogurt group produced statistically significant results, with all framing op-
tions eliciting statistically identical behaviors. In sum, in three out of five study 
groups, positive frames elicited very different responses from those resulting 
from negative frames. 
The core hypotheses in my study addressed the disagreement in the mixed-
framing scholarship. In contrast to the more recent medical literature, the order 
of the frames (negative-positive or positive-negative) was expected to have no 
statistically significant impact and lead to statistically identical outcomes. If this 
assumption proved correct, I hypothesized that mixed frames (as a combined 
variable) would lead to intermediate results—that is, results in between the 
means of purely positive and purely negative frames. These results were expected 
to differ markedly from both negative and positive single frames. 
As predicted, Figure 1 shows that the means of the negative-positive frame 
and the positive-negative frame were statistically identical across all five study 
groups. Statistically speaking, mixed frames were indistinguishable. Because of 
this finding, the two mixed-frame categories were pooled into one variable. 
Figure 2 compares that mixed-frame variable to both negative and positive 
frames. Both negative and positive frames generally differed from mixed 
frames—which resulted in intermediate responses. In particular, the negative 
frame was significantly different from the mixed frames for ground beef (t =  
-2.16, p < 0.04) and gasoline (t = -6.71, p < 0.001). The positive frame signifi-
cantly differed from the mixed frame for soup (t = -2.24, p < 0.025) and gasoline 
(t = -2.49, p < 0.015). 
In sum, mixed frames in three out of five control groups were statistically 
different from the respective single frames. This conclusion elucidates the rela-
tionship between mixed frames and single frames: generally, mixed frames differ 





DIFFERENCES IN MEANS BETWEEN MIXED FRAMES 
Note. All responses are based on a Likert scale indicating propensity to buy. Possible responses 
ranged from 0 (extremely unlikely) to 100 (extremely likely). Each vertical bar (a 95% confidence 
interval) represents the difference in means between the positive-negative frame and the negative-
positive frame. Across all categories, the confidence intervals contain zero, which means that there 
are no statistically significant differences between the means of the mixed (negative-positive and 
positive-negative) frames. 
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FIGURE 2. 
DIFFERENCES IN THE MEANS BETWEEN SINGLE FRAMES AND MIXED FRAMES 
 
Note. All responses are based on a Likert scale indicating propensity to buy. Possible responses 
ranged from 0 (extremely unlikely) to 100 (extremely likely). Each vertical bar (a 95% confidence 
interval) represents the difference in means between a single frame and the corresponding mixed 
frame (pooled variable). If the interval contains zero, the difference is not statistically significant—
meaning that the means of the single frame and the mixed frame are indistinguishable. Whenever 
the confidence interval does not contain zero, the mean of the single frame and the mean of the 
mixed frame are significantly different. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates the 
5% level, and *** indicates the 1% level. 
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A few brief additional comments on the results are warranted. Contrary to 
the general literature on framing effects,
128
 consumer behavior in response to the 
framing of soup attributes was flipped: respondents preferred soup under the 
“negative” frame describing the fat percentage. The percent fat frame for soup 
thus behaves like a positive frame. One possibility is that the fat content of soup 
might be a positive, affect-laden characteristic for consumers. When consumers 
buy a product less frequently, as in the case of soup, they might be more inclined 
to buy items that they believe to be tastier (as in, fattier). Or, perhaps, because 
canned soups vary in thickness, fat content might operate as a proxy for thicker 
soups. Considerations of this nature are outside the scope of my Note’s research. 
What matters here is not the direction of the framing effect (or its explanation). 
Rather, what matters is that the familiar trend holds true: single frames polarize 
preferences, and mixed frames fall in the middle. 
Moreover, and perhaps less surprisingly, framing effects do not always ap-
pear. Take the yogurt and T-shirts groups as examples. Whether single or mixed, 
the frames were statistically indistinguishable from one another. For the T-shirts 
control group, this outcome was expected: that study group had been included 
exactly with the expectation that framing effects would be minimal. For the yo-
gurt group, the results were somewhat more surprising, although there might 
be a number of explanations for this outcome. Most simply, consumers may not 
have strong preferences about the fat content of their yogurt. But again, provid-
ing explanations for consumer behavior is not the goal of this Note. For whatever 
reason, however the fat content of yogurt is framed consumer preferences are 
not significantly affected. This is consistent with the theory of this Note: mixed 
frames provide neutral information. When framing effects are nonexistent, 
mixed frames are no better or worse than single frames. But when framing effects 
matter, mixed frames are the most neutral option for providing complete disclo-
sures. 
Returning to this Note’s analysis, it is important to draw two nonstatistical 
conclusions from these empirical data. First, human behavior is volatile. It is the 
product of complex interactions between personal beliefs and framing choices, 
in addition to attitudes toward the product itself. Second, and most importantly, 
single frames allow consumers to conceive of the same object in different ways. 
In contrast, mixed frames elicit less volatile results because they provide accurate, 
neutral, and complete information. That information diminishes factual miscon-
ceptions, which likely cause the polarized results observed in single framing 
study groups where framing effects occur. 
 
128. See supra Section I.A (surveying the framing literature). 
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i i i .  debiasing through mixed frames:  a new approach to 
regulating food products 
Behavioral economists have long agreed that, due to a number of biases, 
framing affects behavior. Describing ground beef as either 75% fat-free (positive 
frame) or 25% fat (negative frame) will elicit different reactions from consumers. 
But behavioral economics has largely ignored mixed frames—the description of 
ground beef as “75% fat-free/25% fat” (or vice versa).
129
 Yet, the latter type of 
framing has most recently been front and center in Expressions Hair Design.
130
 
Against this backdrop, the current regulatory scheme outlined in Section II.A—
one that largely permits single frames and generally ignores mixed framing—
seems puzzling. 
Section III.A proposes that regulators adopt mixed framing as a way to max-
imize both information disclosure and consumer autonomy. Section III.B high-
lights the absence of any compelling reason for the current state of affairs in 
food-safety regulation—which features mixed framing as a rare exception. Fi-
nally, Section III.C draws some preliminary conclusions about the goals of con-
sumer regulation and how they can best be advanced. Throughout this Part, I 
make the case for a politically feasible regulatory approach to disclosure require-
ments: whenever manufacturers freely choose to disclose information in per-
centage terms, agencies should mandate that their labels include mixed frames. 
Part IV will then defend this regulatory approach from two probable legal chal-
lenges. 
A. A Policy Proposal: Mixed Frames as the Solution 
Here is the elevator pitch: regulators should allow manufacturers and retail-
ers to advertise their products’ attributes in percentage terms only if they do so 
through a mixed frame. In other words, when manufacturers choose to use a 
single frame on their labels, they are required to also disclose the complementary 
frame (thus creating a mixed frame). As has been the case with ground beef for 
decades, other products too should be advertised through mixed frames. Focus-
ing on the example of food, a yogurt label would state: 95% fat-free and 5% fat. 
Soup: 98% fat-free and 2% fat. Milk: 99% fat-free and 1% fat. And so on. That 
is because, as behavioral economists have agreed for decades, single frames are 
 
129. See, e.g., Levin & Gaeth, supra note 121, at 376 (describing a framing experiment without 
mixed frames). 




volatile and lead to polarized results. And picking one frame over the other 
would require the government to take a normative position that is often irrele-
vant to achieving the goals of regulation—and one that would be unnecessarily 
controversial at that. 
While some endorse libertarianism in allowing any frame that the market 
freely provides, others want agencies to be more paternalistic.
131
 With mixed 
frames, regulators can have their cake and eat it too. Manufacturers will not be 
forced to disclose new information prominently on their packaging; rather, they 
will be free to print whatever single frame they chose, if any at all—so long as 
they also include the other complementary and mathematically equivalent frame 
right next to it, creating a mixed frame. And, at least insofar as the internal order 
of the mixed frame does not have a statistically significant impact on consumer 
preferences,
132
 manufacturers should remain free to choose the order in which 
to provide that information (positive-negative or negative-positive).
133
 But, 
through mixed framing, the volatility and misleading nature of single-frame 
product labeling would be neutralized. Mixed framing provides a more neutral 
disclosure mechanism that allows consumers to fully understand the infor-
mation provided. 
Normatively, from the perspective of both paternalism and laissez-faire lib-
ertarianism, a mixed-framing approach is preferable to a single-frame approach. 
Mixed framing best captures the benefits of both sides of the aisle. It appeals to 
laissez-faire libertarians by enhancing consumer autonomy. At the same time, it 
appeals to paternalistic consumer-protection advocates by ensuring that con-
sumers see the flip side of the coin—the attribute frame that manufacturers cur-
rently try to hide. Finally, mixed framing also minimizes the costs of paternalistic 





131. Cf. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 216 (suggesting that manufacturers should be required 
to “identify the potential negative consequences associated with their product . . . rather than 
the positive consequences associated with” it as a way of debiasing). 
132. See supra Section II.B (outlining the results of my original behavioral study, showing no sta-
tistically significant difference between the positive-negative and the negative-positive frames 
across five study groups). 
133. Notably, my recommendation might be different if future data showed that the internal order 
of mixed frames mattered. For instance, if negative-positive frames elicited reactions similar 
to those of negative frames, but positive-negative frames had intermediate results, then I 
would likely suggest requiring positive-negative frames. Because my data strongly support 
the absence of any statistical difference between positive-negative and negative-positive 
frames, however, I will refrain from further speculating about counterfactuals. 
134. See supra Section II.B (showing the effects of positive and negative frames). 
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Mixed framing, in sum, is a minimally intrusive regulatory tool to foster 
more informed, autonomous decision-making through disclosure require-
ments—arguably the goal of libertarians and paternalists alike. First, by mandat-
ing a mixed frame, consumers are empowered to understand—on their own 
terms and through the lenses of their own affect-laden cognitions—the complete 
characteristics of a product. Mixed frames strengthen consumers’ ability to make 
informed decisions, allowing them to rationally interpret language in light of 
their personal beliefs, emotions, and preferences. Second, as further discussed in 
Section IV.B, mixed framing does not package information in a way that influ-
ences consumer choices in a certain direction; rather, it promulgates information 
in the most neutral way possible (by offering both sides of the coin) with the 
goal of reducing the grounds for factual misconceptions. 
In fact, mixed frames are the archetype of neutral information. Mixed fram-
ing discloses information by “[n]ot supporting or helping either side in a con-
flict” and “[h]aving no strongly marked . . . characteristics or features.”
135
 In-
deed, mixed framing presents both sides of the framing “conflict.” It counteracts 
the effects of the manufacturer’s preferred frame by including a complementary 
and logically identical frame. In doing so, mixed framing neutralizes the volatil-
ity of single framing by packaging the information in a format that allows con-
sumers to fully internalize the disclosure. And it is this volatility—as shown em-
pirically in Part II—combined with the partial nature of the information 
conveyed through single frames that signals how uninformed and inconsistent 
decision-making might be afoot. 
This is the normative foundation of mixed frames: a path out of the tradi-
tional partisan debate between rational-choice libertarianism and behavioral-
economics paternalism. To be sure, some food regulators have cursorily consid-
ered the potential of mixed framing in the past.
136
 But they have done so unsat-
isfactorily and without success. The next Section explains how, even then, there 
was no persuasive reason for failing to adopt mixed framing in food-labeling 
rules. Bolstered by my new empirical work, there is even less of a reason to refuse 
to do so now. 
B. Shortcomings in the Current Food-Safety Regulatory Scheme 
As outlined in Section II.A, at the end of a three-decades-long process of 
formal rulemaking, the preference for mixed frames was largely lost. A 1982 
 
135. Neutral, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES: ENG. (2018), https://en.oxforddictionaries.com 
/definition/neutral [https://perma.cc/7QA9-W5DE]. 
136. See supra Section II.A (discussing the history of percent fat-free labels). 
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guidance promulgated by the FSIS required that “[p]ercent fat free statements, 
e.g., ‘95% Fat-Free’, . . . [must] also bear[] a positive declaration of the product’s 
fat content, e.g., ‘contains 5% fat.’”
137
 That sweeping approach was never incor-
porated into a formal rule.
138
 In the end, the FSIS preserved mixed frames only 
for a very narrow category of meat products.
139
 And the FDA abandoned mixed 
frames entirely.
140
 Mixed frames became a forgotten unicorn of the regulatory 
state. 
The FDA’s reasoning in rejecting mixed frames was simple on its face, yet 
flawed. Because (i) a product labeled as “percent fat-free” must also meet the 
“low fat” definition
141
 and (ii) percent fat-free claims are accompanied by a state-
ment referring consumers to the Nutrition Facts label, which includes the total 
amount of fat in the product, no further disclosure was needed.
142
 In sum, the 
FDA concluded, such products did not add an excessive amount of fat to one’s 
diet, and a consumer had all the information she needed readily available. In 
declining to adopt mixed frames, however, the FDA relied on three mistaken as-
sumptions—none of which supports the conclusion that mixed framing should 
not be adopted. 
1. Misleading 
At an intuitive level, the FDA did not consider the possibility that single 
frames might fail to provide enough information to meet the Agency’s statutory 
directive and diminish “misleading” statements. Through its formal rulemaking 
proceedings in the 1990s, the FDA sought to ensure that “foods bearing a ‘per-
cent fat-free’ claim will not contribute [an] excessive amount of fat to the total 
diet.”
143
 Indeed, the FDA promulgated its 1993 rule out of a statutory mandate 
to ensure clear product labeling; under the Nutrition Labeling and Education 
 
137. FSIS Memorandum, supra note 104, at 45. 
138. See Nutrition Labeling of Meat and Poultry Products, 58 Fed. Reg. 632, 651 (Jan. 6, 1993) 
(codified as amended at 9 C.F.R. §§ 317.36, 381.462 (2018)). 
139. See Nutrition Labeling of Single-Ingredient Products and Ground or Chopped Meat and 
Poultry Products, 75 Fed. Reg. 82148, 82157-58 (Dec. 29, 2010) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 
317, 381). 
140. See Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Definition of 
Terms; Definitions of Nutrient Content Claims for the Fat, Fatty Acid, and Cholesterol Con-
tent of Food, 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2330 (Jan. 6, 1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 5, 101). 
141. 21 C.F.R. § 101.62(b)(iii)(2) (2018) (laying out a complex definition that varies based on por-
tion sizes and the food’s dehydrated or processed nature). 
142. Food Labeling, 58 Fed. Reg. at 2330-31. 
143. Id. at 2330. 
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Act (NLEA) of 1990, the Agency “shall permit statements describing the amount 
and percentage of nutrients in food which are not misleading”
144
 because a food 
is “misbranded” if its labeling is “false or misleading in any particular.”
145
 Spe-
cifically, a food is misbranded if a claim is made on the label that characterizes 
the level of any nutrient of the type required to be declared in nutrition label-
ing—unless the claim conforms to the specific requirements of the Act.
146
 More 
generally, to determine if a label is misleading, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act of 1938 considers “not only representations made or suggested by statement, 
word, design, device, or any combination thereof, but also the extent to which 
the labeling or advertising fails to reveal [material] facts.”
147
 In sum, borrowing 
a dictionary definition, labels should not “cause [consumers] to believe some-
thing that is not so, whether by words or silence, action or inaction.”
148
 
In light of the empirical data discussed in Section II.B, the misleading nature 
of percent fat-free labels is at least probable, for what is “misleading” depends 
on consumer perceptions. As the Sixth Circuit recently held, “the scientific va-
lidity of a consumer’s belief is not the standard for reasonableness. Rather, ‘[i]n 
considering charges of false and deceptive advertising, the public’s impression is 
the only true measure of deceptiveness.’”
149
 In fact, in FTC v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp., Judge Robert Bork recognized that, although it is not the case 
that “consumer survey evidence must, as a matter of law, be presented to support 
a finding that an advertisement has a tendency to deceive,” empirical evidence is 
useful in evaluating ambiguous labels.
150
 Percent fat statements on their own are 
potentially misleading because consumers may see two similar percentages but 
fail to understand how different they are in dietary terms. The insights of the 
behavioral-economics approach discussed in Part II, as well as the empirical data 
collected in this Note, show that an average consumer might not feel that “90% 
fat-free” differs significantly from “95% fat-free.” But the first contains twice as 
much fat as the second. 
If anything, then, mandating mixed frames whenever manufacturers wish to 
include percent fat-free claims would bring the FDA in compliance with its own 
 
144. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 3, 104 Stat. 2353, 2361 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2018)) (emphasis added). 
145. 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1). 
146. Id. § 343(r)(1)(A). 
147. Id. § 321(n). 
148. Misleading, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
149. ECM BioFilms, Inc. v. FTC, 851 F.3d 599, 611 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting FTC v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 39-40 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). 
150. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d at 40. 
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stated goals and statutory mandate. Beyond the duty to prevent misleading la-
bels, the NLEA also provides that a product may not be labeled with a percent 
fat-free statement if it contains fat in an amount that increases “the risk of disease 
or a health related condition”—unless the label “discloses the level of such fat or 
saturated fat in immediate proximity to such claim and with appropriate prom-
inence which shall be no less than one-half the size of the claim with respect to 
the level of cholesterol.”
151
 For over thirty years experts have agreed that people 
should adopt a diet that reduces total fat intake as a way of diminishing the in-
cidence of numerous health conditions.
152
 But allowing percent fat-free claims 
does the exact opposite: it incentivizes fat intake by framing the fat content in a 
way that misleads consumers by priming them to conceive of a product as largely 
free from fat. There is thus little doubt that the FDA has the required delegated 
authority to mandate mixed frames—and, indeed, doing so would bring the 
Agency one step closer to compliance with its mandate. 
2. Technical Terms 
The FDA failed to consider the possibility that consumers might not possess 
the technical knowledge necessary to interpret the meaning of permissible per-
cent fat-free statements. The FDA believed that, since a label that includes a per-
cent fat-free statement must also meet the complex “low fat” definition under its 
regulation, no further disclosure was necessary.
153
 But it is rather unlikely that 
consumers know that, according to the Federal Register, only “low fat” foods 
may present a percent fat-free or percent lean label,
154
 especially where meat and 
poultry products do not follow the same rule.
155
 Or that the “low fat” definition 
varies depending on portion sizes as well as the processed or dehydrated nature 
of the food product.
156
 In other words, these are “technical terms” beyond con-
sumers’ knowledge base. As the D.C. Circuit has long recognized, “in situations 
 
151. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-535, § 3, 104 Stat. 2353, 2358 (cod-
ified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2018)). 
152. See supra Section II.A (discussing the consensus in the 1980s). 
153. Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Definition of Terms; 
Definitions of Nutrient Content Claims for the Fat, Fatty Acid, and Cholesterol Content of 
Food, 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2330-31 (Jan. 6, 1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 5, 101). 
154. Id. 
155. Nutrition Labeling of Single-Ingredient Products and Ground or Chopped Meat and Poultry 
Products, 75 Fed. Reg. 82148, 82157 (Dec. 29, 2010) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 317, 381) 
(adopting mixed frames for ground-meat products). 
156. 21 C.F.R. § 101.62(b)(iii)(2) (2018). 
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involving ‘technical . . . terms,’ it may become reasonable to assume that mem-
bers of the public may be ‘unaware of the . . . meanings of such terms’ and that 
‘substantial numbers’ [of consumers] might be misled.”
157
 Percent fat labels 
should be understood as technical terms, especially given their complex regula-
tory history. 
3. Bold Fonts 
The FDA mistakenly assumed that consumers carefully read “nutrition facts” 
labels, which are typically written in exponentially smaller and plainer fonts. But, 
as the Ninth Circuit has noted, consumers simply “expect that the ingredient list 
contains more detailed information about the product that confirms other repre-
sentations on the packaging.”
158
 Moreover, in the words of the Second Circuit, 
consumers “should not be expected to consult the Nutrition Facts panel on the 
side of the box to correct misleading information set forth in large bold type on 
the front of the box.”
159
 Front-of-package statements not only include positive 
frames, which are likely to elicit excessive buying; they also divert consumers’ 
attention from mandated disclosures contained in the Nutrition Facts labels.
160
 
Though only six of ten consumers look at nutrition labels,
161
 they are all forced 
to see the boldly printed front-of-package percent fat-free statements and absorb 
that information. Percent fat-free labels bear a striking resemblance to the 
“Smart Choices” scheme adopted by Kellogg, Kraft, and Unilever, which was 
eventually discontinued following public outcry and FDA condemnation.
162
 It is 
not hard to infer why these labels are so common: they reasonably elicit certain 
kinds of reactions from consumers by emphasizing a specific way of thinking 
about the advertised objects. 
 
157. FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 652 (1985)). 
158. Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 939-40 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). 
159. Mantikas v. Kellogg Co., 910 F.3d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 2018). 
160. See Brian Roe et al. , The Impact of Health Claims on Consumer Search and Product Evaluation 
Outcomes: Results from FDA Experimental Data, 18 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 89, 99-101 (1999). 
161. See, e.g., Nicholas Jay Ollberding et al., Food Label Use and Its Relation to Dietary Intake Among 
US Adults, 110 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 1233, 1233 (2010) (finding that 61.6% of participants 
reported using the Nutrition Facts panel). 
162. See Letter from Michael R. Taylor & Jerold R. Mande to the Smart Choices Program, U.S. 




C. Making Sense of the Goals of Consumer Regulation 
In some contexts, it could be tempting to rely on the sort of evidence dis-
cussed in Section III.B and reach a conclusion similar to Jolls and Sunstein’s ar-
gument in the breast cancer example: the negative frame should be mandated in 
an effort to debias consumers through framing.
163
 In the context of food label-
ing, that conclusion would assume that (i) consumers, in reading percent fat-
free statements, are affected by bounded rationality which leads them to make 
nonrational decisions; (ii) purely positive frames cause consumers not to follow 
their true preferences; and (iii) purely negative frames alleviate bounded ration-
ality and highlight consumers’ true preferences. 
This Note neither supports nor disputes those assumptions in any given con-
text. Rather, it focuses on the more general point that agencies often do not need 
to answer any of those questions in order to protect consumers—not even when 
they accept, as behavioral economists do, that framing does have an effect on 
human behavior. 
Oftentimes, agencies should stay clear of minimizing (or maximizing) affect. 
And most certainly they should not attempt to turn people into rationalist au-
tomata.
164
 In many contexts, such as food labeling, the regulatory state should 
not be picking sides—as much as I would personally like to see it veer more de-
cisively in a proconsumer direction. When the goal of regulation is informing 
consumers and empowering them to make informed decisions, paternalistic reg-
ulations might not only fall short of ideal; they may also be unnecessarily hard 
to promulgate. Agencies can better use their resources elsewhere, and mixed 
framing is an easy, noncontroversial way to provide complete and neutral infor-
mation. In sum, consumer-protection law should not choose single framing as 
the orthodox way of conveying product attributes.
165
  
Instead, this Note shows a way of empowering people to make choices based 
on neutral and complete information. Mixed framing aims at allowing affective 
diversity, respecting consumer autonomy, and promoting informed decision-
making by mandating a pluralistic frame, such that people may—to put it in Dan 
 
163. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 216. 
164. See generally Posner, supra note 5 (arguing that economic models have abandoned the model 
of “hyperrational” actors). 
165. Dan Kahan claims that the law should not “embrace a partisan moral orthodoxy as citizens 
seek to identify the most efficacious means of achieving putatively secular ends” in their fight 
against cognitive illiberalism. Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
115, 118 (2007). Instead, political actors should self-consciously construct a discourse com-
prising a plurality of justifications, distinct from the plurality of worldviews held by members 
of the society and yet capable of affirming those competitive viewpoints. See id. at 146. 
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Kahan’s terms—maximize the richness and variety of their affect-laden cogni-
tions.
166
 Such an approach would neither be unprecedented nor politically un-
feasible. 
Although it is certainly hard to predict the likelihood that the agencies would 
promulgate mixed-framing regulations under their statutory authority, there is 
some precedent. Beyond the case of ground-meat products discussed in Section 
II.A, one does not have to look far for similar examples: aside from the case of 
Expressions Hair Design, think about fabric percentages on clothing labels, drug 
side effects, or vaccine efficacy. But mixed framing has never been considered in 
other contexts, and the consumer-protection scholarship has completely ignored 
this tool. It is therefore unsurprising that this approach does not appear to be on 
the regulators’ radar. 
Moreover, mixed frames would be politically viable. As discussed in Section 
II.A, mixed frames on food labels were common in the 1970s, and it was the 
producers themselves who petitioned the Agency to allow mixed framing for 
ground-meat products.
167
 From the manufacturers’ point of view, then, there 
would seem to be little intrinsic evil in mixed frames—or, at the very least, one 
that they can live with. Single-frame disclosures are voluntary, and the additional 
costs of using a mixed-framing format would be negligible. Lastly, mixed frames 
can satisfy both paternalist agencies and free-market-libertarian regulators, thus 
boosting their bipartisan appeal: they enhance consumer autonomy while also 
preventing deception.
168
 Even in today’s deregulatory climate, mixed-framing 
regulation could be feasible. 
Yet, as it happened with the graphic warnings on cigarette packaging, for 
instance,
169
 the food industry would likely challenge any additional disclosure 
requirement—even a minimally intrusive one like mixed framing.
170
 As Section 
IV.A discusses in more detail, the probable First Amendment challenge against 
mixed-framing regulations as unconstitutionally compelled commercial speech 
is unlikely to succeed. 
 
166. Cf. id. at 145 (arguing that, instead of attempting to cleanse the law of partisan meanings, 
lawmakers should infuse it with so many meanings that every cultural group can find affir-
mation of its competitive worldview within it). 
167. See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text. 
168. See supra Section III.A; infra Section IV.B. 
169. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in part by Am. 
Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
170. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Product Warnings, Debiasing, and Free Speech: The Case of Tobacco Reg-
ulation, 169 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 53 (2013). 
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iv.  first amendment and paternalism concerns 
Regulations based on mixed framing might be normatively desirable, and 
they might even help agencies approximate their statutory objectives. But that 
alone does not make the proposal constitutional. First Amendment jurispru-
dence could potentially cast any regulation of attribute framing as an unconsti-
tutional infringement on the freedom of speech. In particular, for some, debi-
asing through mixed framing could amount to unconstitutionally compelled 
commercial speech. For others, even if constitutional, mixed framing might be 
nothing but another tool of paternalistic bureaucrats. 
This Part completes the case for mixed framing by addressing two central 
critiques. Section IV.A discusses how mixed-framing regulations survive First 
Amendment scrutiny, while Section IV.B differentiates my mixed-framing pro-




 Throughout this Part, I 
will continue to map out the normative and analytic properties that make mixed 
framing a superior approach to consumer protection. 
A. First Amendment Challenges to Debiasing Through Mixed Framing 
Because regulation often entails mandatory disclosures, it might evoke pos-
sible conflicts with the First Amendment. Given that “nearly all human action—
and so state regulation—operates through communication, the First Amend-
ment possesses near total deregulatory potential.”
173
 This quality, some have ar-
gued, renders the First Amendment similar to a pipe wrench: it “is so often 
pressed into service for tasks on the periphery of its central purposes”
174
 that it 
 
171. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 5-6 (2008) (“Libertarian paternalism is a relatively weak, soft, and 
nonintrusive type of paternalism because choices are not blocked, fenced off, or significantly 
burdened . . . . [P]rivate and public choice architects . . . are self-consciously attempting to 
move people in directions that will make their lives better. They nudge.”). 
172. See id. at 6 (defining a “nudge” as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s 
behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their 
economic incentives” with the goal of making their lives better); PETE LUNN, REGULATORY 
POLICY AND BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS 9 (2014) (“[B]ehavioural economics and so-called 
‘nudges’ are distinct. The former is a scientific subdiscipline; the latter is a particular way to 
apply its findings to policy, which holds that policy makers should avoid regulations that limit 
choice (bans, caps, etc.) but can use behavioural science to direct people towards better 
choices.”). 
173. Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 176. 
174. Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN 
THE MODERN ERA 175, 176 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffery R. Stone eds., 2002). 
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constitutes “both the first and the last refuge of saints and scoundrels alike.”
175
 
In particular, modern regulatory tools such as mandatory disclosures are more 
prone to appear speech regulating than the traditional mandates and bans on 
conduct, and they have thus “placed the modern regulatory state in greater po-
tential tension with the First Amendment.”
176
 
Mixed frames, if seen as compelled commercial speech, would fall within the 
scope of the First Amendment. In the words of the Supreme Court, commercial 
speech is “speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction”
177
 
or an “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its 
audience.”
178
 But it “is not stripped of First Amendment protection merely be-
cause it appears in that form.”
179
 It is settled law that product labels are commer-
cial speech.
180
 So, if the government mandates certain labels (such as mixed 
frames), it is undeniably compelling commercial speech.
181
 
From the point of view of consumers, there are two main rationales for pro-
tecting commercial speech. One is its “informational function.”
182
 According to 
Robert Post, commercial speech doctrine is motivated by “the cognitive contri-
bution of speech to democratic decision-making, rather than the legitimation-
producing effects of speech understood as a vehicle of participation.”
183
 Indeed, 
“in a free market economy, the ability to give and receive information about com-
mercial matters may be as important, sometimes more important, than expres-
sion of a political, artistic, or religious nature.”
184
 Another rationale is its social 
function. Martin Redish thought that commercial speech was constitutionally 
 
175. Id. at 193. 
176. Shanor, supra note 173, at 164. 
177. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. 
Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). 
178. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). 
179. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975). 
180. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481 (1995) (treating beer labels as commercial 
speech entitled to protection under the First Amendment); see also, e.g., Bad Frog Brewery, 
Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding a product label to be 
commercial speech). 
181. See Ellen P. Goodman, Visual Gut Punch: Persuasion, Emotion, and the Constitutional Meaning 
of Graphic Disclosure, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 513, 515 (2014) (providing examples of compelled 
commercial speech). 
182. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563. 
183. Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. 
REV. 2353, 2371-72 (2000) (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563). 




valuable insofar as it promoted social welfare—and that is why “its values are 




While the First Amendment has historically barred compelled public 
speech,
186
 compelled commercial speech is different. There is little doubt that 
compelled commercial speech is a distinct doctrine under the First Amend-
ment.
187
 In Zauderer, the Supreme Court clearly distinguished between commer-
cial and noncommercial compelled speech.
188
 It held that, where the government 
has only attempted to “prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertis-
ing” through disclosures that are “purely factual and uncontroversial,” an adver-
tiser’s “constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual 
information in his advertising is minimal.”
189
 In those instances, in fact, com-
pelled commercial speech is justified because it “dissipate[s] the possibility of 
consumer confusion or deception,”
190
 which is “more likely to make a positive 
contribution to decisionmaking than is concealment of . . . information.”
191
 As 
Post put it, “Regulations that force a speaker to disgorge more information to an 
audience do not contradict the constitutional purpose of commercial speech doc-
trine”; instead, they may actually enhance it.
192
 In other words, free speech in-
 
185. Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values 
of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 432-34 (1971). 
186. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (“The 
essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary 
public expression of ideas . . . . There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, a con-
comitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom 
of speech in its affirmative aspect.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. 
Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 1968))). 
187. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. 
REV. 1, 3 (1976) (“[G]iven the existing form of social and economic relationships in the 
United States, a complete denial of first amendment protection for commercial speech is not 
only consistent with, but is required by, first amendment theory.”). But see Jonathan H. Adler, 
Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer “Right to Know,” 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 435 
(2016) (“Such analyses make the mistake of reading Zauderer as providing an alternative test 
for compelled commercial speech, as opposed to a relatively straightforward application of the 
Central Hudson framework . . . .”). 
188. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985). 
189. Id. at 651. 
190. Id. 
191. Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994). 
192. Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 877 (2015). 
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terests implicated by compelled commercial disclosures “are substantially 
weaker than those at stake when speech is actually suppressed.”
193
 
Unlike other kinds of compelled speech that have historically undergone ju-
dicial review as stringent as that of their restrictive counterparts,
194
 commercial 
speech may be mandated if the inclusion of “additional information, warnings, 
and disclaimers”
195
 survives a reasonableness test. In Zauderer, the Supreme 
Court reasoned that, “as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related 
to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers,” there is no First 
Amendment violation.
196
 Unlike restrictions on commercial speech, then, com-
pelled commercial speech does not always need to be the least restrictive means 
to “directly advance[]” a substantial governmental interest, as required by Cen-
tral Hudson.
197
 Instead, purely factual and uncontroversial disclosure require-
ments must only be “reasonably related” to some governmental interest.
198
 And 
several federal circuit courts have held that when the government compels com-
mercial speech, Zauderer might only require that it point to its interest in correct-
ing deception.
199
 In sum, rational basis review applies to purely factual and un-
controversial compelled commercial speech.
200
 
Scholars disagree about the First Amendment implications of compelled 
commercial disclosures. According to some, commercial speech is protected “to 
serve democratic competence.”
201
 Therefore, compelling commercial speech is 
 
193. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652 n.14. 
194. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“[T]he action of the 
local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge . . . invades the sphere of intellect 
and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from 
all official control.”). 
195. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 
(1976). 
196. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
197. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
198. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
199. See, e.g., CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 854 F.3d 1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2017); Am. 
Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, 
Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 524 (6th Cir. 2012); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 
429 F.3d 294, 310 (1st Cir. 2005); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114-15 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
200. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 132 (2d Cir. 2009) (“In 
light of Zauderer, this Circuit thus held that rules ‘mandating that commercial actors disclose 
commercial information’ are subject to the rational basis test.” (quoting Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 
114-15)). 
201. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 42 (2012). 
beyond nudging 
2075 
permissible because it “can augment the flow of accurate information to the pub-
lic and so actually advance the constitutional purpose of public education.”
202
 
Others fear that compelled speech empowers the government to “artificially am-
plif[y] its own message through the mouths of unwilling citizens, giving listen-
ers a mix of information skewed to the government viewpoint.”
203
 
Mandated disclosures have been the objects of at least some successful con-
stitutional challenges, especially in recent years. The case of cigarette packaging 
is perhaps the best-known example of compelled commercial speech serving 
consumer interests that has been attacked on First Amendment grounds.
204
 Al-
though the tobacco industry did not challenge verbal warnings on cigarette pack-
ages, it strongly opposed the graphic ones mandated by the Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009.
205
 And it succeeded. In 2012, the 
D.C. Circuit struck down the rule requiring graphic warning labels.
206
 And even 
though that decision was later overruled in part,
207
 the warnings have not yet 
been implemented.
208
 A Securities and Exchange Commission rule that required 
firms using “conflict minerals” to report links to the Congo faced a similar 
fate.
209
 In both cases, finding that the regulations did not require “purely factual 





 speech, the D.C. Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny, not Zau-





203. Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech Cases, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 329, 333 
(2008). 
204. In an attempt to resist the increasing threat of government regulations in the early 1970s, the 
tobacco industry shifted its focus from scientific claims to a free speech rhetoric. See STANTON 
A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS 185-86 (1996). 
205. Jolls, supra note 170, at 56. 
206. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1214-15 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in part by 
Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
207. Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 22-23 (explaining that, “[t]o the extent that” R.J. Reynolds limits 
the “reasonably related” standard to legally required disclosures that are targeted to “correct-
ing deception, we now overrule [it]”). 
208. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. FDA, 330 F. Supp. 3d 657, 660 (D. Mass. 2018) (finding that 
“the FDA has both ‘unlawfully withheld’ and ‘unreasonably delayed’ agency action [on to-
bacco warning labels], and that pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (‘APA’), the 
court must compel agency action”). 
209. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 362-63 (D.C. Cir. 2014), overruled in part by Am. Meat 
Inst., 760 F.3d 18. 
210. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1215-16. 
211. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 748 F.3d at 370-71. 
212. Id. at 372; R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217. 
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Like many other disclosure schemes,
213
 mixed-framing regulations would 
survive rational basis review. Indeed, because mixed framing does not compel 
either deceptive or ideological speech, the Zauderer level of scrutiny squarely ap-
plies.
214
 Under a rational basis test, government actions “may be based on ra-
tional speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data,”
215
 as long as they 
are “reasonably related” to some governmental interest.
216
 Mixed framing ex-
ceeds that low bar. Regulations relying on mixed framing provide accurate, “fac-
tual[,] and uncontroversial” information to prevent consumer deception.
217
 As 
shown in Section II.B, single (positive or negative) frames have the potential to 
deceive consumers. Mixed-framing regulations simply mandate that, if a manu-
facturer wishes to include a label stating “98% fat-free,” it must also disclose the 
complementary and equivalent statement “2% fat.” Moreover, mixed framing 
furthers the state’s interest in improving consumer’s health—just as New York 
City’s calorie-disclosure requirement, according to the Second Circuit, furthered 
the government’s “goal of reducing obesity.”
218
 In sum, mixed-framing regula-
tions meet rational basis review. 
Even if a court applied intermediate scrutiny, as the D.C. Circuit did for 
graphic cigarette packaging and conflict-minerals rules, mixed framing would 
 
213. Examples abound. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act requires that food products bear a dis-
closure label if they contain artificial coloring or flavoring, with limited exceptions. See 21 
U.S.C. § 343(k) (2018). Federal law also mandates that food labels include their sodium con-
tent. See id. § 343(q)(1)(D). Similarly, fur clothing must bear a label identifying the type of 
animal that produced the fur, the country of origin, and whether it is used fur. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 69b (2018). Vehicle manufacturers must label each vehicle with its fuel economy in accord-
ance with regulations issued by the Environmental Protection Agency. See 49 U.S.C. 
§ 32908(b) (2018). And mutual funds advertising their prior performance must disclose that 
past performance is not a reliable indication of future performance. See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.482(b)(3)(i) (2018). 
214. Cf. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 877 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 2017) (suggesting that 
a law that only allows “merchants to post the cash price alongside the credit card price, using 
something like [a] dual-price scheme” that resembles a mixed frame, would likely be subject 
to Zauderer review), certified question answered, 117 N.E.3d 730, 737 (N.Y. 2018). But see Micah 
L. Berman, Manipulative Marketing and the First Amendment, 193 GEO. L.J. 497, 499 (2015) 
(pointing out that review of commercial speech “has gradually become more and more strin-
gent over time”). 
215. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). 
216. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
217. Id. 





 Under the three applicable prongs of the Central Hudson test,
220
 
compelled commercial speech meets intermediate scrutiny if (i) “the asserted 
governmental interest is substantial,” and the mandated speech (ii) “directly ad-
vances the governmental interest asserted” and (iii) “is not more extensive than 
is necessary to serve that interest.”
221
 To be sure, the Supreme Court has offered 
“little guidance” on how to apply this test: “Exactly which state interests are 
‘substantial’? How ‘directly’ must a state regulation advance a substantial gov-
ernment interest? How narrowly tailored must a regulation be?”
222
 Yet the Cen-
tral Hudson test has been compared to intermediate scrutiny.
223
 Mandating a dis-
closure that is mathematically and logically equivalent to information already 
voluntarily disclosed by manufacturers, and doing so to directly halt misleading 
information, clearly meets intermediate scrutiny. 
Mixed framing satisfies the first Central Hudson prong because it advances 
the government’s substantial interest in accurate information. Indeed, mixed 
framing ensures the availability of accurate, factual information that is vital to 
consumers.
224
 In National Electric Manufacturers Ass’n v. Sorrell, for example, the 
Second Circuit upheld a statute mandating manufacturers to disclose the pres-
ence of mercury in their products on the grounds that “mandated disclosure of 
accurate, factual, commercial information . . . furthers, rather than hinders, the 
First Amendment goal of the discovery of truth and contributes to the efficiency 
 
219. It is important to note here that, because Zauderer held that compelled commercial speech is 
entitled to First Amendment protection “less extensive than that afforded ‘noncommercial 
speech,’” strict scrutiny is not an option. 471 U.S. at 637; see also Allen Rostron, Pragmatism, 
Paternalism, and the Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 37 VT. L. REV. 527, 572 (2013) 
(“Applying strict scrutiny to compelled disclosures that fall outside Zauderer . . . runs counter 
to the Supreme Court’s frequent suggestion that disclosure requirements pose much less of a 
threat to First Amendment values than speech restrictions.”). 
220. The first prong of the Central Hudson test—whether the restricted commercial speech “con-
cern[s] lawful activity and [is] not . . . misleading”—is hardly applicable to compelled com-
mercial speech. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
221. Id. 
222. Post, supra note 192, at 881. 
223. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995). 
224. Cf. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 28 (2000) 
(“Within commercial speech, . . . the primary constitutional value concerns the circulation of 
accurate and useful information. For the state to mandate disclosures designed more fully and 
completely to convey information is thus to advance, rather than to contradict, pertinent con-
stitutional values.”). 
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of the ‘marketplace of ideas.’”
225
 Mixed framing does just that: it forces manu-
facturers to disclose the complementary frame they would otherwise omit, and 
provide vital, accurate, and factual information to consumers. And “[p]rotecting 
consumers from unwitting harm,”
226
 often to their health,
227
 caused by mislead-
ing and partial information is as important as “the government’s interest in pro-
tecting consumers from fraud or deception.”
228
 
Mixed framing satisfies the second Central Hudson prong, too—because 
mixed framing has a direct impact on purchasing habits and information pro-
cessing. Empirical data suggest that single frames can be misleading and that any 
number of psychological biases can lead consumers to make inconsistent choices. 
As shown in Section II.B, mixed framing possesses an empirically proven ability 
to address information asymmetries that single framing might cause. Mixed 
framing, that is, offers the most neutral way of framing product attributes. For 
this reason, mixed framing directly furthers the state’s substantial interest in en-
suring that people have all of the accurate information they need to make auton-
omous decisions. 
Because mixed-framing regulations would not be more extensive than is nec-
essary to serve the government’s substantial interests, the third prong of Central 
Hudson is also satisfied. The mandated disclosure here is rather minimal and not 
burdensome: it involves the disclosure of the complementary frame if, and only 
if, the manufacturer chooses to include a percentage statement on the label. For 
mixed frames of food attributes, the compelled disclosure involves just one num-
ber, one symbol, and one word (such as adding the disclosure “2% fat” next to 
the manufacturer’s voluntary statement “98% fat-free”). And even if that infor-
mation were deemed redundant in an exercise of judicial second-guessing,
229
 
that does not mean it is unnecessarily extensive. As discussed in Section II.B, the 
 
225. 272 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir. 2001). 
226. Adler, supra note 187, at 443. 
227. See, e.g., George A. Bray & Barry M. Popkin, Dietary Fat Intake Does Affect Obesity!, 68 AM. J. 
CLINICAL NUTRITION 1157, 1157 (1998) (“[A]mple research from animal and clinical studies, 
from controlled trials, and from epidemiologic and ecologic analyses provides strong evidence 
that dietary fat plays a role in the development and treatment of obesity.”); Fats and Choles-
terol, HARV. T.H. CHAN SCH. PUB. HEALTH, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/nutritionsource
/what-should-you-eat/fats-and-cholesterol [https://perma.cc/ZW6R-PPFM] (“Rather 
than adopting a low-fat diet, it’s more important to focus on eating beneficial ‘good’ fats and 
avoiding harmful ‘bad’ fats.”). 
228. Adler, supra note 187, at 443. 
229. Cf. Donald W. Garner & Richard J. Whitney, Protecting Children from Joe Camel and His 
Friends: A New First Amendment and Federal Preemption Analysis of Tobacco Billboard Regulation, 
46 EMORY L.J. 479, 559 (1997) (noting the extent of “judicial second-guessing encouraged by 
the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test”). 
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framing of disclosures matters. Data show that even accurate and factual infor-
mation can be deceptively framed. And that is why mixed framing furthers First 
Amendment interests: it ensures that ideas (fat content, for instance) are acces-
sible and neutrally conveyed. 
B. What Mixed Framing Is Not: Paternalism and Nudging 
The regulatory approach I propose, in a nutshell, furthers important govern-
mental interests by allowing affective diversity, respecting consumer autonomy, 
and promoting informed decision-making based on neutral and complete infor-
mation. But many might object that mandating the disclosure of redundant in-
formation (such as the percentage of fat in the presence of percent fat-free 
claims) is at least mildly paternalistic—and, in the end, is mere nudging. 
I disagree, and this last Section discusses what debiasing through mixed 
framing is not. Mixed framing is neither a kind of paternalistic regulation nor 
another tool of behavioral economists to nudge consumers. Instead, mixed fram-
ing disproves central assumptions in both behavioral economics and rational-
choice theory: that information cannot be neutrally conveyed and that con-
sumer-oriented regulation diminishes autonomy. Mixed framing represents a 
way of neutrally promulgating food-attribute information—a theoretically ap-
pealing path to viable, consumer-oriented policy reform. 
Before moving further along, though, it is important to pause on the thresh-
old question: what is paternalism?
230
 Traditional approaches go back to John 
Stuart Mill’s notion that paternalism amounts to “saying to another human crea-
ture of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what he 
chooses to do with it.”
231
 In that vein, Gerald Dworkin has defined paternalism 
as “roughly the interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by reasons 
referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values 
of the person being coerced” without her consent.
232
 Others have endorsed sim-
ilarly Millian definitions.
233
 Thus, the key aspects of traditional paternalism are 
infringement on autonomy and coercion. 
 
230. See generally Gerald Dworkin, Defining Paternalism, in PATERNALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
25, 28-31 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2013) (outlining a list of competing defini-
tions of paternalism). 
231. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY, WITH THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN AND CHAP-
TERS ON SOCIALISM 1, 76 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1859). 
232. Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, 56 MONIST 64, 65 (1972). 
233. See, e.g., DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION: THE MORAL BOUNDS ON BE-
NEVOLENCE 22 (1986) (arguing that an agent engages in paternalism through a deliberate act 
or omission if (i) she believes that intervention to be contrary to the other person’s “operative 
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But interference with autonomy might not always be necessary to assign the 
paternalism label. If one accepts Sunstein and Thaler’s definition of libertarian 
paternalism, then the problem is any “attempt to influence people’s behavior 
even when third-party effects are absent” by “steer[ing] people’s choices in di-
rections that will improve the choosers’ own welfare.”
234
 This is a very weak def-
inition, engulfing as paternalistic a number of acts significantly greater than al-
most any other traditional definition. Under this conception of paternalism, if 
an action is intended to steer choices, and those effects are meant to enhance the 
target’s welfare, then that action is paternalistic—even if the act has no impact 
on autonomy or liberty and no coercion is involved (this is the libertarian as-
pect). In other words, only intent to steer choices and intent to improve welfare 
are needed for libertarian paternalism. 
1. Traditional Paternalism 
Various charges of paternalism may be waged against mixed-framing regu-
lations. Under the more traditional definitions, some might argue that consum-
ers will find mixed frames redundant in light of the information already dis-
closed via single frames. After all, everyone knows that 95% fat-free yogurt is 5% 
fat. But failure to provide information, such as the fat percentage, on those 
grounds is even more paternalistic—and it is misleading to boot. It is far from 
clear why it should not be up to the consumer to decide what information is truly 
redundant, or why anyone should deprive consumers of the freedom to make 
that judgment. And the data show that single frames skew consumer behavior 
toward one end of the preference spectrum.
235
 Mixed frames, instead, avoid that 
volatility of information by packaging the same information that the manufac-
turer chooses to disclose in a neutral and nonmisleading way. 
But the paternalism criticism could run deeper, reaching the core assump-
tions behind the mixed-framing proposal: isn’t it intrinsically paternalistic to as-
sume that consumers need a plurality of information to make informed deci-
sions? That objection is doubly flawed. 
 
preference, intention, or disposition,” and (ii) “the primary or sole aim” of that intervention 
is to benefit or prevent harm to the other person); Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Con-
servatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 
1211, 1211 (2003) (describing paternalistic regulations as “tread[ing] on consumer sovereignty 
by forcing, or preventing, choices for the individual’s own good, much as when parents limit 
their child’s freedom to skip school or eat candy for dinner”). 
234. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2003). 
235. See generally supra Section II.B. 
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First, the objection includes the unstated premise that a mixed frame 
amounts to a “plurality” of information. As discussed in Part I and empirically 
demonstrated in Part II, the components of a mixed frame (two single frames) 
appear to allow consumers to internalize different information about a given 
product. In other words, these frames present partial information. On their own, 
the individual single frames are inadequate vehicles for neutral and complete in-
formation. Although the single frames logically convey the same information, 
they express it in different ways. And those different expressions elicit polarized 
reactions. In other words, the only additional information supplied through 
mixed framing is logically equivalent to that already provided by a single frame. 
Through mixed framing, then, there is no plurality of information. There is only 
a plurality of expressions of the same information. 
Second, even if mixed frames did provide a plurality of information, this ob-
jection unsoundly assumes that less information is sufficient to allow individuals 
to make more autonomous decisions. Under this line of argument, consumers do 
not need more information to make informed decisions because the only infor-
mation they need is the partial information that the market freely provides. In 
other words, any government-mandated disclosure of information is a form of 
paternalism because it forces the market to provide more information. But that 
is the flaw of this line of criticism: not all mandated disclosures tread on auton-
omy by paternalistically attempting to influence behavior. The effect of mixed 
frames is the neutral promulgation of information. And one cannot act autono-
mously, free from external influences, when a third party (the manufacturer, for 
instance) favors partial information over access to more complete and neutral 
information.
236
 That choice architecture, indeed, is the hallmark of paternalism. 
The antipaternalistic and libertarian argument that less information ought to be 
provided to consumers relies on the unsound assumption that decision-making 
is more autonomous when it is more uninformed.  
 
236. Cf. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 94-95 (Roger Crisp ed. & trans., 2000) (c. 384 B.C.E.) 
(“By voluntariness I mean . . . that which lies in an agent’s power and which he does know-
ingly, that is, not in ignorance of the person affected, the instrument used, or the end of the 
action . . . . An involuntary action, then, is one performed in ignorance, or, if not in ignorance, 
beyond the agent’s control or under compulsion . . . .”). 
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2. Libertarian Paternalism and Nudging 
Because we are often unaware of our preferences and we must construct 
them, and because it is frequently inevitable that others will manage our prefer-
ences,
237
 libertarian paternalism is appealing. Though preferences must be man-
aged for the good of those affected (paternalism), such management should not 
annul freedom of choice (libertarianism).
238
 According to Thaler and Sunstein, 
nudging is a kind of libertarian paternalism.
239
 A “nudge” is an aspect of choice 
architecture—that is, the “organizing [of] the context in which people make de-
cisions.”
240
 Nudges “alter[] people’s behavior in a predictable way without for-
bidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.”
241
 
Therefore, behavioral economists conclude that, “[i]n the real world[,] the dis-
tinction between informing people and nudging them almost always breaks 
down” because, for example, you almost always have to order information.
242
 
There is some truth to this statement. Once you disclose information, you must 
put it in some order. Choice architecture is often inevitable.
243
 
But not always: informing people without nudging them is still possible. 
Mixed framing, I argue, is one way to do so. Mixed framing operates only in 
situations where some information is already voluntarily provided by manufac-
turers. In that case, the question is: how can that information be framed without 
pushing consumers in a particular direction? Where, as Section II.B demon-
strated, single frames lead to polarized behaviors, mixed frames emerge as the 
least volatile way of communicating information to consumers. As a threshold 
matter, because the data show that the order (positive-negative or negative-pos-
itive) of mixed frames has no statistically significant impact on behavior, the dis-
tinction between informing and nudging does not seem to break down when it 
 
237. See, e.g., Slovic, supra note 32, at 369 (arguing that “preferences are not simply read off some 
master list but are constructed on the spot by an adaptive decision maker” through a series of 
cognitive tools used by boundedly rational consumers to make decisions). 
238. See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175, 
176-78 (2003). 
239. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 171, at 5 (“The libertarian aspect of our strategies lies in 
the straightforward insistence that, in general, people should be free to do what they like—
and to opt out of undesirable arrangements if they want to do so . . . . The paternalistic aspect 
lies in the claim that it is legitimate for choice architects to try to influence people’s behavior 
in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and better.”). 
240. Id. at 3. 
241. Id. at 6. 
242. Lichtenberg, supra note 10, at 669 (emphasis added). 
243. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 171, at 118-22. 
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comes to mixed framing (at least empirically). Most importantly, this Note’s al-
ternative approach to regulation does not steer consumers, or even nudge them, 
to act in a certain way. Its only goal is to fully inform, regardless of how consum-
ers will behave in response to the information. In other words, mixed framing 




Instead, mixed framing endorses the idea that people should be provided 
with neutral and complete information so that they can choose wisely—ration-
ally interpreting language in light of their (however irrational) personal beliefs, 
emotions, and preferences. As Martin H. Redish put it, “[S]elf-rule is fostered 
by the receipt of information that enables the individual to make life-affecting 
decisions in a more informed fashion.”
245
 Mixed framing should be adopted not 
because it reliably produces a certain outcome; instead, it is appealing because it 
empowers consumers to choose their preferred outcome, free from third-party 
attempts to shape the universe of information upon which they rely. 
That democracy, as C. Edwin Baker points out,
246
 or economic markets, as 
Cass Sunstein argues,
247
 may operate with optimal rather than complete infor-
mation is “beside the point.”
248
 The evidence from empirical data is that optimal 
yet partial information is volatile and leads to polarized consumer behavior, elic-
iting results so significantly different from one another as to provide evidence of 
potentially inconsistent decision-making. Mixed frames are one solution. “The 
assumption underlying this approach is that people’s poor choices arise only 
from ignorance rather than from other cognitive or emotional shortcomings.”
249
 
Mixed framing, in other words, diminishes the grounds for ignorant behavior 
while maximizing consumers’ autonomy to be ignorant. 
Mixed framing allows consumers to make decisions from a position of neu-
trality It empowers individuals to be autonomous, in the sense that it prevents 
 
244. Cf. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 238, at 179. 
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Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 678, 682 (1982). 
246. See C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish’s The 
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L. REV. 653, 655-56 (1993) (“Perhaps the market has produced the optimal level of infor-
mation. The optimal level is not complete information. If the optimal level is produced, there 
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248. Redish, supra note 245, at 683. 
249. Lichtenberg, supra note 10, at 664. 
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any third party (whether the government or a manufacturer) from shaping and 
influencing an individual’s choices by favoring partial information over access to 
more complete and neutral information. Either mixed frame (positive-negative 
or negative-positive) can serve its goal of informing consumers. It gives them 
the information they need to act autonomously, without nudging them toward 
either end of the spectrum or allowing some third party to steer their decision-
making process in a certain direction. Whether consumers will take that infor-
mation and act in a welfare-maximizing way is up to their autonomous decision 
making. Mixed framing only ensures that—by minimizing polarizing framing 
effects and third-party choice architecture—neutral, accurate, and complete in-
formation is maximized. 
conclusion 
Regulators have thus far approached consumer-protection law in a binary 
fashion: either they adopt the rational-choice view and a laissez-faire stance, or 
they side with the existing behavioral-economics literature and its paternalistic 
overtones. This Note argues that a much better approach is available than the 
existing behavioral law-and-economics scholarship has suggested. Consumer-
protection law should not choose one (single) framing as the orthodox way of 
conveying product attributes, nor should it leave it completely up to the market 
to choose. Instead, mixed framing is a politically viable approach for the regula-
tory state to enhance consumer protection, and one that is already familiar to 
business groups.
250
 Mixed framing has the potential to debias consumers by 
taming the otherwise polarizing effects of purely positive or purely negative 
frames. 
In closing, it is worth noting that the impact of mixed framing is not limited 
to the food-labeling case emphasized in this Note. For example, mixed framing 
could be a palatable solution to the legal challenge in Expressions Hair Design, 
 
250. In the 1990s, as noted in Section II.A, trade associations representing both manufacturers and 
retailers petitioned the FSIS to allow mixed frames for ground beef because they had been 
using a “percent lean/percent fat” labeling system ever since 1973, when the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture developed the Uniform Retail Meat Identity Standards. See Nutrition Labeling 
of Ground Beef and Hamburger, 59 Fed. Reg. 26916, 26917 (proposed May 24, 1994) (to be 
codified at 9 C.F.R. § 317.362). 
beyond nudging 
2085 
discussed in the Introduction.
251
 Because dual pricing in New York is legal,
252
 
gasoline prices could be advertised as “$3.00 (cash discount) / $3.30 (credit-card 
surcharge),” or vice versa. This pricing scheme, which effectively allows mer-
chants to communicate price differences between credit-card and cash pur-
chases,
253
 could serve to fully inform consumers just as mixed-framing disclo-
sures do in the percent fat scenario. 
To be sure, future research should focus on the breadth of the benefits of 
mixed-framing approaches. Does mixed framing work equally effectively across 
all industries and products? There might be ingredients, such as aspartame, 
whose health effects are so unclear that a mixed frame would not inform con-
sumers any better than a single frame would.
254
 Would a consumer internalize 
any more valuable information from a label that stated “99% aspartame free / 
1% aspartame” as opposed to a single-frame statement? Shifting to the medical 
context, information about the side effects and efficacy of vaccines, for instance, 
might benefit from a mixed-framing approach.
255
 Yet my proposal doesn’t dis-
count the normative importance of pursuing more aggressive paternalistic regu-
lation in limited high-stakes cases.
256
 In those cases, it might well be that regu-
lators should pursue an approach that is biasing in a particular direction, rather 
 
251. See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text (discussing Expressions Hair Design v. Schnei-
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ing.”); see also N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (McKinney 2018) (making it a crime, punishable by 
a $500 fine and/or up to one year in prison, for any “seller in any sales transaction [to] impose 
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(No. 15-1391) (“JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Wu, you think . . . that the dual pricing scheme is 
legal; is that right? MR. WU: That’s correct.”). 
253. Cf. Expressions Hair Design, 117 N.E.3d at 731, 737 (holding that a single-sticker pricing scheme 
such as “$10.00, and if you pay with a credit card you will pay 3% extra” or “$10.00, and if 
you pay with a credit card you will pay an additional 30 cents” is illegal under New York law 
because it “does not express the total dollars-and-cents credit card price and instead requires 
consumers to engage in an arithmetical calculation, in order to figure it out”). 
254. See, e.g., Natalia Cardoso Santos et al., Metabolic Effects of Aspartame in Adulthood: A Systematic 
Review and Meta-Analysis of Randomized Clinical Trials, 58 CRITICAL REVIEWS FOOD SCI. & NU-
TRITION 2068, 2068 (2018) (“Data about harms or benefits associated with the consumption 
of aspartame, a non-nutritive sweetener worldwide consumed, is still controversial.”). 
255. See, e.g., Bigman et al., supra note 63, at S70 (discussing a study employing mixed frames in 
assessing the perceived effectiveness of HPV vaccines). 
256. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 211 (explaining that if women “underestimate the value 
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than debiasing. Answers to these and other similar questions warrant further 
attention. 
Moreover, further research on the inner workings of mixed framing as a de-
biasing tool could have broader implications for core assumptions in behavioral 
law-and-economics scholarship. Two potential explanations are worth floating. 
On the one hand, the distinction between intuitive (System 1) and deliberative 
(System 2) thought processes might explain the effects of mixed framing.
257
 
Sometimes we process information “automatically and quickly, with little or no 
effort and no sense of voluntary control” (System 1); other times we “allocate[] 
attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, . . . overruling the free-
wheeling impulses and associations” (System 2).
258
 Mixed frames could be re-
sponsible for triggering System 2 processing, therefore leading to debiasing. On 
the other hand, mixed framing might be better described as a process of double 
biasing. The components of a mixed frame might “push people in conflicting 
directions,” thus nullifying the effects of the respective single frames.
259
 The sta-
tistically insignificant recency effect noted in Section II.B might be a piece of 
evidence in favor of this second alternative. Either way, behavioral law and eco-
nomics might have to account for the possibility that, oftentimes, the best way 
to respond to the limits of human cognition is through neutral efforts to improve 
the accuracy and completeness of people’s factual perceptions. 
To conclude, this Note does not aim to take a position on the effectiveness of 
other potential implementations of mixed framing. Nor does it wish to take a 
stance on which explanation (if any) lies behind the phenomenon of mixed 
framing. Rather, this Note’s goal is simple: to offer an initial theory of mixed 
framing. It hopes to jump-start the important conversation about mixed fram-
ing, offer some ideas, and reserve some central questions for later contributions. 
Mixed frames are superior to the more volatile and misleading single frames be-
cause they foster affective diversity, respect consumer autonomy, and promote 
informed decision-making without nudging consumers toward either end of the 
spectrum. Consumer-protection law is in need of a détente, and grounding 
product regulations on mixed frames would be a viable and promising move in 
that direction. 
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